University of Cincinnati Law Review
Volume 82

Issue 3

Article 1

August 2018

Federalism and Phantom Economic Rights in NFIB v. Sebelius
Matthew J. Lindsay

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr

Recommended Citation
Matthew J. Lindsay, Federalism and Phantom Economic Rights in NFIB v. Sebelius, 82 U. Cin. L. Rev. 687
(2018)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol82/iss3/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and
Publications. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Cincinnati Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications. For more information, please contact
ronald.jones@uc.edu.

Lindsay: Federalism and Phantom Economic Rights in NFIB v. Sebelius

FEDERALISM AND PHANTOM EcoNOMIC RIGHTS
IN NFIB V.SEBELIUS
Matthew J Lindsay *
Few predicted that the constitutionalfate of the PatientProtection and
Affordable Care Act would turn on Congress'powerto lay and collect
taxes. Yet in NFIB v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court upheld the
centerpiece of the Act-the minimum coverage provision (MCP),
commonly known as the "individual mandate"-as a tax.
The
unexpected basis of the Court's holding has deflected attention from
what may prove to be the decision's more constitutionallyconsequential
feature: that a majority of the Court agreed that Congress lacked
authority under the Commerce Clause to penalizepeople who decline to
purchase health insurance. Chief Justice Roberts and the four joint
dissenters endorsed the novel limiting principle advanced by the Act 's
challengers, distinguishing between economic "activity, " which
Congress can regulate, and "inactivity," which it cannot. Because the
commerce power extends only to "existing commercial activity, " and
because the uninsured were "inactive" in the market for health care,
they reasoned, the MCP was not a regulation of commerce within the
meaning of the Constitution.
Critically, supporters of the
activity/inactivity distinction insisted that it was an intrinsic constraint
on congressional authority anchored in the text of Article I and the
structural principle of federalism, rather than an "affirmative"
prohibitionrooted in a constitutionalliberty interest.
This Article argues that the neat dichotomy drawn by the Chief Justice
and joint dissenters between intrinsic and rights-based constraints on
legislative authority is illusory, and that it obscures both the underlying
logic and broader implications of the activity/inactivity distinction. In
fact, that distinction is rooted less in the constitutional enumeration of
powers orfederalism than in a concern about individual liberty. Even
in the absence of a formal constitutional "right" to serve as a doctrinal
vehicle, the Justices' defense of economic liberty operates analogously
to the substantive due process right to "liberty of contract" during the
Lochner era-as a triggerfor heightened scrutiny of legislative means
and ends.

* Assistant Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. I am grateful to David
Bernstein, Kim Brown, Barry Cushman, C.J. Peters, Kim Reilly, Dan Sharfstein, and Colin Starger for
their generosity and critical insight. Megan Burnett provided outstanding research assistance.
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Currentscholarship addressingthe role of individual liberty in NFIB v.
Sebelius tends to deploy Lochner as a convenient rhetoricaltouchstone,
to lend an air of illicitness or subterfuge to the majority's Commerce
Clause analysis. This Article argues that the Lochner-era substantive
due process cases are both more nuanced and more instructive than
judges and many scholars have realized. They illustrate, in particular,
that constraints on legislative authority that are rooted in individual
liberty and constraints on legislative authority that are rooted in
enumerated powers and federalism can and do operate in dynamic
relationship to one another. Reading NFIB v. Sebelius through this
historical lens better equips us to interrogate the role that economic
liberty plays in the majority's Commerce Clause analysis, andprovides
an important alternative analyticalframework to the structure/rights
dichotomy advanced by the Chief Justice and joint dissenters. The
activity/inactivity distinction not only portends a constitutionally dim
future for federal purchase mandates, but may also herald more farreaching restrictions on congressional interference with economic
liberty, in which individualsovereignty assumes a place alongside state
sovereignty in the Court'sfederalism.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Few predicted that the constitutional fate of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA) would turn on Congress' power to lay and
collect taxes.' Yet in NFIB v. Sebelius,2 the Supreme Court upheld the
centerpiece of the Act-the minimum coverage provision (MCP),
commonly known as the "individual mandate"-as a tax under the
General Welfare Clause of Article I. The unexpected constitutional
basis of the Court's holding, 3 along with its dramatic political
implications, have deflected attention from what may prove to be the
decision's more constitutionally consequential feature: that a majority of
the Court 4 agreed that Congress lacked authority under the Commerce
1. But see Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REv. 1, 45 (2010) (arguing that the MCP
was a constitutional exercise of Congress' taxing power); Brian Galle, The Taxing Power, the
Affordable Care Act, and the Limits of Constitutional Compromise, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 407 (2011)
(same). Though few commentators anticipated the basis of the Court's holding, Chief Justice Roberts'
decision to uphold the individual mandate as a tax was to some extent foreshadowed by his wellestablished history as a judicial minimalist, who prefers "maintaining the status quo" and "narrow[ing]
the role of the Court in public affairs." Jonathan H. Adler, JudicialMinimalism, the Mandate, and Mr.
Roberts, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 171,
176-77 (Nathaniel Persily, Gillian E. Metzger & Trevor W. Morrison eds., 2013). Consistent with that
posture, Jonathan Adler explains, Roberts has sometimes adopted even strained "saving constructions of
federal statutes to preserve their constitutionality." Id at 174.
John Fabian Witt proposes that the Chief Justice's apparently broad, antiformalist reading of
the tax power can be traced back through Judge Henry Friendly, an important intellectual and
professional mentor of Roberts for whom the future Chief Justice clerked, to Louis D. Brandeis, a key
architect of the modem American state for whom Friendly had clerked. Both Friendly and Brandeis
preached "defertence] to the elected branches whenever possible," and applied a distinctively
functionalist approach to Congress' tax power. John Fabian Witt, The Secret History of the Chief
Justice's Obamacare Decision, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE, supra, at 218. "Roberts practical
evaluation of the ACA," Witt concludes, and particularly his willingness to construe the MCP as a tax,
thus "drew on a long professional history" comprised of "a remarkable line of American jurists yoked
together by relations of mentorship and professional connections." Id. at 221.
2. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
3. Notwithstanding the divergence of opinion among the courts of appeal-see Thomas More
Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011) (upholding the MCP as a valid exercise of the
commerce power); Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011)
(striking down the MCP as an improper exercise of the commerce power); Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661
F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (upholding the MCP as a valid exercise of the commerce power)-throughout
the litigation the vast preponderance of legal observers, including many well-known legal conservatives,
believed that the MCP was clearly a constitutionally valid exercise of the federal commerce power, and
predicted that at least five, and perhaps as many as eight, justices would vote to sustain the provision on
that ground. As Charles Fried, President Reagan's Solicitor General, put it: "[H]ealth care is interstate
commerce. Is this a regulation of it? Yes. End of story." Ezra Klein, Reagan's Solicitor General:
'Health care Is Interstate Commerce. Is This a Regulation of It? Yes. End of Story', WASH. POST
WONKBLOG (Mar. 28, 2012, 1:09 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/reaganssolicitor-general-health-care-is-interstate-commerce-is-this-a-regulation-of-it-yes-end-ofstory/2011/08/25/glQAmaQigS blog.html. It was only during oral argument in March 2012 that the
breadth and depth of the Justices' skepticism toward the government's commerce rationale became
evident.
4. The specific alignment of opinions on the Commerce Clause issue presents a challenge of
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Clause to penalize people who decline to purchase health insurance.5
Specifically, Chief Justice Roberts and the four joint dissenters 6
endorsed the novel limiting principle advanced by the Act's challengers,
distinguishing between economic "activity," which Congress can
regulate, and "inactivity," which it cannot. Because the commerce
power extends only to "existing commercial activity," and because the
uninsured were "inactive" in the market for health care, they reasoned,
Congress could not compel the uninsured to purchase health insurance
on the ground that their failure to do so affects interstate commerce.
The five Justices that rejected the government's commerce rationale
went to considerable lengths to emphasize that the activity/inactivity
distinction was an intrinsic constraint on congressional authority
anchored in the text of Article I and the structural constitutional value of
federalism, rather than an "affirmative" prohibition rooted in an
individual right. Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts opened his opinion with
a civics lesson on the nature and limits of federal authority. "[R]ather
than granting general authority to perform all the conceivable functions
of government, the Constitution lists, or enumerates, the Federal
Government's powers,"8 he explained. That constitutional enumeration
was "also a limitation of power, because '[t]he enumeration presupposes
something not enumerated."' 9 At stake in that limitation, first and
foremost, was the principle of dual sovereignty. In order to stave off
nomenclature. Five justices agreed that the MCP was not a valid exercise of the commerce power, but
because the case was decided on other grounds-i.e. under the General Welfare Clause-we cannot
properly call the Chief Justice and the joint dissenters' shared conclusion with respect to the commerce
power a "holding" of the Court. That conclusion may well have significant influence on future
Commerce Clause cases because it carries the weight of five Justices, but because it is inessential to the
outcome of the case, it is dicta. When this Article refers to a "majority" of the Court, it is not intended
to suggest that the shared conclusion of the Chief Justice and the joint dissenters is a holding, or
otherwise binding.
5. This is not to suggest that the potentially broad implications of the majority's Commerce
Clause analysis have entirely escaped notice. Immediately following the decision, for example, some
commentators suggested that, by upholding the individual mandate on other grounds, Roberts
immunized himself and the Court against charges of politically motivated judicial activism, in effect
conceding the battle over the ACA in order to gain a long-term tactical advantage in the federalist war
against the expansion of federal regulatory authority. On this reading, his opinion becomes an act of
judicial statesmanship worthy of Chief Justice Marshall's decision in Marbury v. Madison. See, e.g.,
Bradley Joondeph, A Marbury for Our Time, SCOTUSBLOG (June 29, 2012, 2:36 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/a-marbury-for-our-time/; Daniel Epps, In Health Care Ruling,
Roberts Steals a Move from John Marshall's Playbook, THE ATLANTIC (June 28, 2012, 12:47 PM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/nationallarchive/2012/06/in-health-care-ruling-roberts-steals-a-move-fromjohn-marshalls-playbook/259121/.
6. The dissenting opinion in NFIB v. Sebelius was attributed jointly to Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2642 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
7. See id. at 2585-93 (majority opinion); see also id at 2644-50 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas,
and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
8. Id. at 2577 (majority opinion).
9. Id. (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 195 (1824)).
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federal encroachment on the sovereignty of the states, the Chief Justice
counseled, the commerce power "must be read carefully to avoid
creating a general federal authority akin to the police power." 0
This framing raises a fundamental and ultimately perplexing question
about the logical connection between the activity/inactivity distinction
and the structural constitutional value of federalism. Specifically, how
does exempting from Congress' commerce power individuals who
might plausibly be characterized as "inactive" in the regulated
commercial market serve the proper allocation of authority between the
states and the federal government? Neither the Chief Justice nor the
joint dissenters provide a satisfactory answer. The incongruity between
the specific limiting principle endorsed by the Justices and the structural
constitutional value that their opinions purport to serve begs the question
of whether other, unacknowledged values are at play. This Article
argues that, notwithstanding the Chief Justice and joint dissenters'
insistence to the contrary, the activity/inactivity distinction is animated
less by concerns about constitutional structure than concerns about
individual economic liberty. Specifically, even in the absence of a
formal constitutional economic "right" to serve as a doctrinal vehicle,
the Justices' defense of economic liberty operates much as the
substantive due process right to "liberty of contract" did during the
Lochner era-as a trigger for heightened scrutiny of legislative means
and ends, through which the majority narrowed the intrinsic scope of the
commerce power.
This Article is hardly the first to suggest that the activity/inactivity
distinction "' seems more redolent of Due Process Clause arguments'
than any principled enumerated powers analysis,"" as the U.S.
Government argued in its brief to the Court.12 Scholarly critics noted
10. Id. at 2578.
11. Brief for Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Provision) at 51, Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (Nos. 11-393, 11-398, 11-400), 2012 WL 37168, at *51 [hereinafter
Brief for United States] (quoting Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).
12. President Obama joined in as well, clumsily proclaiming to a gathering of newspaper editors
that "[a law] passed by Congress on an economic issue, like health care ... has not been overturned at
least since Lochner, right? So we're going back to the '30s, pre New Deal." Obama's Remarks to
Newspaper Editors, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/04/us/politics/
obamas-remarks-to-newspaper-editors.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0. In fact, the President was engaging
in a long and robust tradition of invoking Lochner-usually as a metonym for Lochner-era police
powers jurisprudence more generally-as a convenient, if often intellectually sloppy, symbol of
illegitimate judicial activism. See Robert Bames, Health-CareArguments Recall a Supreme CourtCase
That Is an Equal-Opportunity Offender, WASH. POST (Apr. 8, 2012), http://articles.
washingtonpost.com/2012-04-08/politics/35451691_1_law-rulings-supreme-court (quoting former judge
Robert Bork characterizing Lochner as "the symbol, indeed the quintessence, of judicial usurpation of
power," and Chief Justice Roberts stating at his confirmation hearing that "you can read [the Lochner]
opinion today and it's quite clear that they're not interpreting the law, they're making the law"). As
Professor David Bernstein has observed, "Lochner has been treated as a unique example of
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throughout the ACA litigation that the principle "sound[s] in notions of
personal liberty rather than state autonomy," 3 and identified a
"fundamental mismatch" between the challengers' evident concern with
protecting individual liberty and the federalism-based limiting principle
they were advocating.14 This Article argues that, in both the Lochnerera substantive due process cases and in NFIB v. Sebelius, the
relationship between the Court's defense of individual economic liberty
and its enforcement of limits on legislative authority that are intrinsic to
the authority itself, is more nuanced than is generally acknowledged.
Existing scholarship tends to invoke Lochner as a convenient rhetorical
touchstone, to lend an air of illicitness or subterfuge to the constitutional
liberty interest smuggled into the Court's Commerce Clause
jurisprudence.
On this reading, the activity/inactivity distinction
operates, like the right to "liberty of contract" during the Lochner era, as
an anti-compulsion principle that erects within the otherwise broad
domain of congressional authority a bastion of individual economic
liberty that Congress cannot breach. And in fact, the Chief Justice and
joint dissenters objected forcefully to the economic compulsion inherent
in the individual mandate.' 5 This Article instead uses the Lochner-era
substantive due process cases to illustrate how constraints on legislative
authority that are rooted in "fundamental" economic rights and
constraints on legislative authority that are rooted in federalism and the
constitutional enumeration of powers necessarily operate in dynamic
constitutional pathology to serve the felt rhetorical needs of advocates of various theories of
constitutional law . . . ." DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 6-7 (2011). On the use and abuse of Lochner in modem
constitutional discourse, see also Gary D. Rowe, Lochner Revisionism Revisited, 24 LAW & Soc.
INQUIRY 221, 223 (1999) (describing the "ghost of Lochner" in post-New Deal constitutional
adjudication); Jack M. Balkin, "Wrong the Day it was Decided": Lochner and Constitutional
Historicism,85 B.U. L. REv. 677 (2005).
Predictably, critics of the ACA pointed to a number of inaccuracies in the President's
statement, including the fact that Lochner involved a state regulation, not an act of Congress; that
Lochner was decided in 1905, not the 1930s; and that the Court struck down a number of federal
economic regulations between 1905 and its abandonment of Lochner in 1937. See, e.g., James Taranto,
The
Man
Who
Knew
Too
Little,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Apr.
3,
2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303816504577321844137787970.html.
13. Peter J. Smith, Federalism, Lochner, and the Individual Mandate, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1723,
1743 (2011). So, too, is it difficult to overlook the libertarian bona fides of activity/inactivity
distinction's chief scholarly advocates. See Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the
Individual Health Insurance Mandate is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581 (2010); Ilya
Somin, A Mandatefor Mandates: Is the Individual HealthInsurance Case a Slippery Slope?, 75 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 75 (2012).

14. Arthur J. R. Baker, FundamentalMismatch: The Improper Integrationof IndividualLiberty
Rights into Commerce ClauseAnalysis of the PatientProtectionand Affordable CareAct, 66 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 259 (2011). See also Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers: The Obvious
Constitutionalityof Health Care Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1 (2011); Mark A. Hall, Commerce
Clause Challengesto Health CareReform, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 1825, 1829 (2011).
15. See infra Part IV.A.
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relationship to one another. The Lochner-era cases thus serve as an
exemplar of how the Court can adapt the scope of both state and federal
authority to vindicate the value of economic liberty.
Perhaps sensitive to the imputation of "Lochnerism,"s the Chief
Justice and the joint dissenters emphatically denied that their reasoning
was animated by a defense of any constitutional liberty interest.17 In
doing so, they drew a broad distinction between the "affirmative,"
"express prohibition[s] in the Bill of Rights or elsewhere," which,
Roberts stressed, "come into play . .. only where the Government

possesses authority to act in the first place,"' 8 and the federalism-based
limits on legislative authority that inhere in the constitutional
enumeration of powers. Whereas the Lochner Court had marshaled the
"substantive due process" right of "liberty of contract" to repel an
otherwise plenary state police power, they insisted, the scope of the
commerce power was defined by the meaning of the words "regulate"
and "commerce," as they are used in Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution. In short, constitutional economic rights were irrelevant to
the MCP because Congress lacked authority under the Commerce
Clause to regulate the uninsured "in the first place."
This Article argues that the Chief Justice and joint dissenters'
insistence on a neat dichotomy between structural and rights-based
constraints on legislative authority is illusory, and that adhering to that

16. As Mark Rosen and Christopher Schmidt helpfully remind us, NFIB v. Sebelius was argued
and decided against the backdrop of vigorous popular constitutional opposition to the ACA, "in which
Barry Goldwater-style, to-the-barricades libertarian rhetoric was in the air." Mark D. Rosen &
Christopher W. Schmidt, Why Broccoli? Limiting Principles and Popular Constitutionalism in the
Heath Care Case, 61 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 66, 101 (2013). Because that rhetoric sounded more in the
register of substantive due process economic rights than enumerated powers or constitutional structure,
one can readily understand why the Chief Justice might seek to immunize himself against charges of
"Lochnerism."
17. When, during oral argument, the Solicitor General accused the Act's challengers of
attempting "to import Lochner-style substantive due process" into the Court's Commerce Clause
analysis, Chief Justice Roberts interjected:
The key in Lochner is that we were talking about regulation of the States . . . and the States are
not limited to enumerated powers. The Federal Government is. And it seems to me it's an
entirely different question when you ask yourself whether or not there are going to be limits on
the Federal power, as opposed to limits on the States, which was the issue in Lochner.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 30-31, Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)
(No. 11-398). On its face, Chief Justice Roberts' rejoinder appears to miss the Solicitor General's point,
as the Lochner-era Court used the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to substantively limit
congressional regulation in precisely the same manner that it used the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to substantively limit state police regulations. Because the Chief Justice surely
understands as much, I interpret his statement to mean that, whereas state legislative authority is
constrained only by affirmative rights, which are extrinsic to the police power itself, the enumerated
powers of Congress are (also) limited by their own terms, and that it is those intrinsic limits that are at
issue in this case. As I explain below, see infra Part III, this is a false dichotomy.
18. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012).
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dichotomy impedes our understanding of the limiting principle endorsed
by a majority of the Court. It further argues that the Supreme Court's
Lochner-era substantive due process cases shed valuable light on the
majority's Commerce Clause analysis, but not necessarily in the way
that the Act's defenders have suggested. When we step back from the
remarkably durable mythology of "laissez-faire constitutionalism" that
surrounds Lochner,19 and read the Lochner-era substantive due process
cases on their own terms, we find that, while the Court did embed in the
Fourteenth Amendment a novel and expansive value of individual
economic liberty, it resembled little the constitutional trump against
economic regulation that the slogan "liberty of contract" is often
understood to imply. The affirmative "right" at work in Lochner
operated instead as a trigger for heightened judicial scrutiny of
legislative means and ends. In this respect, the constitutional right to
"liberty of contract" prefigured modem "fundamental rights" analysis. 20
The statute at issue in Lochner-a maximum hours law for bakers-was
ultimately invalid not simply because it interfered with a constitutional
economic right, but because in so doing, the Court concluded, it failed to
serve any of the legitimate ends of state police power-namely, the
protection of the public health or general welfare. The Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment "right" to individual economic liberty furnished
a convenient jurisdictional hook for the Court's selectively aggressive
scrutiny of the challenged legislative rationale. The Lochner-era Court
thus defined the specific limits on legislative authority not, strictly
speaking, according to the presumed demands of constitutional
economic liberty, but rather according to the constitutive terms of both
the state police power and federal commerce power-the meaning of
"general welfare" or "public health," and of "interstate commerce,"
respectively. Reading NFIB v. Sebelius through this historical lens
provides an important alternative framework to the structure/rights
dichotomy advanced by the Chief Justice and joint dissenters. That
framework better equips us to recognize that the value of economic
19. The durability of that myth persists notwithstanding a now-massive body of revisionist
scholarship debunking many of its key conclusions. For a small sampling, see Michael Les Benedict,
Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REv. 293 (1985); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION
BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 19 (1993);
BERNSTEIN, supra note 12; Barry Cushman, Some Varieties and Vicissitudes ofLochnerism, 85 B.U. L.
REV. 881 (2005); Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudenceof Government-Business
Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61 J. Am. HIST. 970
(1975); Balkin, supra note 1; Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History of
Substantive Due Process and the Idea ofFundamentalRights, 97 CAL. L. REV. 751 (2009).
20. See infra note 83 and accompanying text. Since the New Deal, the Court has consistently
refused to recognize a fundamental right to economic liberty. See infra notes 69-70 and accompanying
text.
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liberty infuses the majority's Commerce Clause analysis and, like the
Lochner-era substantive due process cases, operates in dialogue with the
constitutive, intrinsic terms of the commerce power.
Part II of this Article situates the activity/inactivity distinction within
contemporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence in order to highlight its
novelty as a structural constraint on the commerce power. Part III traces
the historical arc of the constitutional right to individual economic
liberty, beginning with its doctrinal origins in Justices Stephen Field and
Joseph Bradley's dissenting interpretations of the Fourteenth
Amendment in the 1870s; to the Court's adoption of a substantive due
process right to "liberty of contract" in Lochner, Adair v. United
States,21 and Adkins v. Children's Hospital;22 and finally, to the New
Deal Court's rejection of substantive due process and fundamental
economic rights. Part IV then reads Chief Justice Roberts and the joint
dissenters' Commerce Clause analyses in NFIB v. Sebelius through the
lens of the Lochner-era cases. It argues that the value of individual
economic liberty operates in their opinions much as the right to "liberty
of contract" did before the New Deal-as a trigger for heightened
means/ends scrutiny, through which the Justices reinterpreted the
intrinsic, constitutive terms of Congress' commerce power. Reading the
activity/inactivity distinction not merely as a narrow prohibition on
federal purchase mandates, but rather as an injunction against
congressional interference with individual liberty, brings the potentially
broader implications of the majority's Commerce Clause analysis into
focus.
II. THE COMMERCE POWER AND THE MINIMUM COVERAGE PROVISION

This Part situates the activity/inactivity distinction within existing
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Subpart A provides a brief overview
of the commerce power since the New Deal, highlighting two key
features. First, even under the "New Federalism" of the past two
decades, regulations enacted under the Commerce Clause continue to
enjoy a presumption of constitutionality, and will be upheld so long as
they bear a rational relationship to a constitutionally permissible end.
Second, to the extent that the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have
reinvigorated the Court's role in enforcing limits on Congress'
commerce authority, their efforts have centered on two discrete types of
regulation: those targeting activities deemed to be "noneconomic"; and
those seeking to coerce, or "commandeer," state officials into

21. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
22. Adkins v. Children's Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
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implementing a federal regulatory scheme. Subpart B then considers the
doctrinal novelty of the activity/inactivity distinction, and reviews the
Justices' insistence that it operates as an intrinsic constraint on
congressional authority that is anchored in the text of Article I and the
structural constitutional value of federalism, rather than an extrinsic,
"affirmative" prohibition rooted in a constitutional liberty interest.
A. The Modern Commerce Power
The recent history of the commerce power is a familiar one. In broad
strokes, beginning in 1937 with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel,23 the
Supreme Court swept away a host of "artificial" constraints on
congressional authority that had accreted over the previous half-century:
the categorical distinctions between "direct" and "indirect" effects on
24
interstate commerce,2 4 or between
"manufacturing" 25 or "mining,",26 on
the one hand, and "commerce" on the other; as well as the notion that
"local trade and manufacture" was the exclusive domain of state and
local authorities. 27 Within a few short years, the Court had virtually
abandoned any meaningful role for the judiciary in policing the scope of
federal economic regulation, effectively conferring on Congress the sole
authority to determine whether a specific object of federal regulation
was sufficiently related to interstate commerce. In the wake of the New
Deal "revolution" in constitutional law, Congress could regulate even
local, intrastate activities that, considered in aggregate, had a
"substantial affect" on interstate commerce. 28 Federal commercial
23. Nat'1 Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
24. See A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
25. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
26. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
27. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 274 (1918). Professor Barry Cushman has complicated
the conventional focus on 1937 as the watershed moment in the New Deal "revolution" in constitutional
law. Cushman argues that the first decisive shift in the Court's Commerce Clause (as well as
substantive due process) jurisprudence came not in 1937, but three years earlier, in Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502 (1934), when the Court abandoned the long-standing distinction between businesses
affected with a public interest, which Congress traditionally had broad authority to regulate under its
commerce power, and "private" businesses, which were buffered against congressional regulation. In
Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. I (1937), Cushman maintains, the Court loosened the strictures on the
federal commerce power, but nevertheless preserved a meaningful role for the judiciary in policing the
constitutional sufficiency of the connection between the regulated activity and interstate commerce. The
true "revolution," Cushman maintains, came several years later, in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941) (upholding wages and hours provisions of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938), and
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding application of regulatory limits on wheat
production in the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 to wheat grown for home consumption), when
the Court virtually withdrew from supervising the constitutionality of federal commercial regulations.
See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION (1998).

28. See Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36-39 (1937);
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regulations would thus enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality,
with reviewing courts deferring to the judgment of Congress so long as
the challenged regulation bore some rational relationship to a
constitutionally permissible end.29 As the Court later explained, the
regulation of interstate commerce "is a matter of policy that rests
entirely with Congress [and] not with the courts." 30 The question of
"what means are to be employed ... is within the sound and exclusive
discretion of the Congress. It is subject to only one caveat-that the
means chosen by it must be reasonably adapted to the end permitted by
the Constitution."31
Finally, the New Deal Court established that the sovereignty of the
states would not operate as an independent constraint on the scope of
Congress' commerce authority. As the Court explained in United States
v. Darby, "[t]he power of Congress over interstate commerce 'is
complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed by the
constitution."' 32 Therefore, "regulations of commerce which do not
infringe some constitutional prohibition are within the plenary power
conferred on Congress by the Commerce Clause,"33 and "can neither be
enlarged nor diminished by the exercise or non-exercise of state
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 119-20 (1941); Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
29. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) ("[R]egulatory legislation
affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless. .. the
facts ... preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and
experience of the legislators."). In Carolene Products, of course, the Court also famously identified
several circumstances in which the "presumption of constitutionality" for commercial regulations may
warrant a "narrower scope." Id. at 152 n.4. These included "legislation [that] appears on its face to be
within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten [a]mendments;"
"legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about
repeal of undesirable legislation;" and statutes that reflect "prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities." Id.
30. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964).
31. Id. at 262. Heart ofAtlanta Motel upheld Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibiting
racial discrimination in public accommodations. "The commerce power ... is a specific and plenary
one authorized by the Constitution itself," the Court explained. Id. at 258. The only questions for a
reviewing court were: "(1) whether Congress had a rational basis for finding that racial discrimination
by motels affected commerce, and (2) if it had such a basis, whether the means it selected to eliminate
that evil are reasonable and appropriate." Id.
32. Darby, 312 U.S. at 114 (rejecting the contention that Congress' regulation of the wages and
hours of labor under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 treaded unconstitutionally into a domain
reserved to the individual states) (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)). A federal
commercial regulation "is not a forbidden invasion of state power," the Court continued, merely because
"its exercise is attended by the same incidents which attend the exercise of the police power of the
states." Id. The quoted passage from Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden has been a
favorite of the post-New Deal Court. See, e.g., Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 147; Heart of Atlanta
Motel, 379 U.S. at 254; Wickard, 317 U.S. at 120, 122; Hodel v. Va. Surface Mineral and Reclamation
Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981).
33. Darby, 312 U.S. at 115.
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power." 34 The Court accordingly rejected the view3 5 that the Tenth
Amendment, reserving to the states or the people "[t]he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution," should be read to
"depriv[e] the national government of authority to resort to all means for
the exercise of a granted power which are appropriate and plainly
adapted to the permitted end." 36 Rather, the Amendment "states but a
truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered."
Throughout the half-century following the New Deal, the Court
sometimes gestured toward certain unspecified "limits"" on the
commerce power, and denied any intention to "obliterate the distinction
between what is national and what is local....
In practice, however,
the breadth of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause
approached, in Chief Justice Rehnquist's words, that of "a general police
power of the sort retained by the States." 40 Indeed, between 1937 and
1994, the Court did not strike down a single federal law as exceeding the
commerce power.
Beginning in 1995 with United States v. Lopez, 4 1 however, and again
five years later with United States v. Morrison,42 the Supreme Court has
reinvigorated the notion that Congress' commerce authority, though
expansive, is something less than plenary. The ACA litigation
represents the most recent chapter in the Court's perpetual recalibration
of its outer limits. In Lopez, the Court set forth what has become the
consensus 4 3 framework for contemporary Commerce Clause analysis,
enumerating three "categories of activity" subject to the commerce
power: 1) "the channels of interstate commerce;" 2) "the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce;"" and 3) activity that "substantially affects
interstate commerce,"4 5 including, the Court later confirmed, "purely
local activities that are part of an economic 'class of activities' that have

34. Id. at 114.
35. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 275-76 (1918) (holding that a federal statute
prohibiting the transportation in interstate commerce of goods produced at factories employing child
laborers was an unconstitutional invasion of state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment).
36. Darby, 312 U.S. at 124.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 (1968).
39. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
40. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
41. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549.
42. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
43. But see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584-602 (Thomas, J., concurring) (rejecting the "substantial
effects" doctrine).
44. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
45. Id. at 560.
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a substantial effect on interstate commerce." 46 At issue in the ACA
litigation was whether the MCP regulated activity that "substantially
affects" interstate commerce.
In both Lopez and Morrison, the constitutional infirmity centered on
what the Court characterized as the noneconomic nature of the regulated
activity. In Lopez, the Court struck down a provision of the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990 making it a federal crime to possess a firearm
within one thousand feet of a school. The majority objected specifically
that the challenged provision "has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any
sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those
terms." 7 In Morrison, the Court struck down a section of the Violence
Against Women Act of 1994 providing for a federal civil remedy for
victims of gender-motivated violence. Like mere gun possession, the
majority concluded, "[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in
any sense of the phrase, economic activity.'
Lopez and Morrison were animated, above all, by the structural
constitutional value of federalism. Only by placing noneconomic
activity beyond Congress' reach, the Lopez Court explained, could the
nation's "dual system of government"49 be preserved. The Morrison
Court thus rejected the attempt to construct a "but-for causal chain"
from a local, noneconomic activity like violent crime "to every
attenuated effect upon interstate commerce."s Were the Court to accept
the government's reasoning that Congress may regulate any activity "as
long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime has substantial
effects on employment, production, transit, or consumption," 5' the
majority reasoned, it would obliterate any "distinction between what is
truly national and what is truly local."52 That rationale would convert
the commerce power into a "plenary police power"'53 that extended not
only to "all violent crime," but also into traditional bastions of state

46. Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005).
47. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. "Even Wickard, which is perhaps the most far reaching example of
Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity," the Court observed, "involved economic activity in
a way that the possession of a gun in a school zone does not." Id. at 560.
48. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000). The majority reached that conclusion
notwithstanding voluminous congressional findings documenting the economic impact of gendermotivated violence. See id. at 628-35 (Souter, J., dissenting).
49. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 (quoting Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
50. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615. See also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (declining to "pile inference
upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States").
51. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615.
52. Id. at 617-18; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568 (citing Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 .. S. at 30).
53. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566).
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regulation, like "marriage, divorce, and childrearing." 54
Finally, the "New Federalism" of the Rehnquist Court reopened the
question of whether the principle of state sovereignty operates as an
independent constitutional constraint on the scope of congressional
authority. In New York v. United States55 and Printz v. United States,56
the Court held that federal statutes requiring state officials to implement
federal regulatory schemes unconstitutionally invaded the 'residuary
and inviolable sovereignty' reserved explicitly to the States by the Tenth
Amendment."57 Although New York interprets the Tenth Amendment
merely as an affirmation that the enumeration of powers in Article I
necessarily connotes intrinsic limits on congressional authority,5 s Printz
does arguably read the Tenth Amendment as an independent constraint
on the powers delegated to Congress. 59 In any case, both New York and
Printz make clear that, to the extent that the principle of state
sovereignty does limit the scope of congressional authority, it does so
only with respect to federal regulations that act directly on states as
states,60 while affirming Congress' broad power to regulate
54. Id. at 615-16.
55. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (striking down the "take title" provision of
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 as exceeding the scope of Congress'
commerce and spending powers).
56. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (striking down the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act as inconsistent with the constitutional principle of "dual sovereignty").
57. New York, 505 U.S. at 188 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
58. As Justice O'Connor explained in her opinion for the majority, the questions of whether an
Act of Congress "is authorized by one of the powers delegated to Congress in Article I" and whether it
"invades the province of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment" were "mirror images of
each other." Id. at 155-56. "If a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution," she explained,
"the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a power is an
attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the
Constitution has not conferred on Congress." Id. at 156. In this respect, "the Tenth Amendment 'states
but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered."' Id. (quoting United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941)). Perhaps most revealing was the manner in which Justice O'Connor
distinguished the operation of the Tenth Amendment from limits on congressional authority rooted in
individual constitutional rights. She explained:
[U]nder the Commerce Clause Congress may regulate publishers engaged in interstate
commerce, but Congress is constrained in the exercise of that power by the First Amendment.
The Tenth Amendment likewise restrains the power of Congress, but this limit is not derived
from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself, which, as we have discussed, is essentially a
tautology. Instead, the Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of the Federal Government is
subject to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power to the States. The Tenth
Amendment thus directs us to determine . .. whether an incident of state sovereignty is protected
by a limitation on an Article I power.
Id. at 156-57.
59. The "[r]esidual state sovereignty" that was "implicit" in the constitutional enumeration of
congressional powers in Article I, Section 8 "was rendered express by the Tenth Amendment[]," Justice
Scalia's majority opinion explained. Printz, 521 U.S. at 919.
60. In both New York and Printz, the unconstitutionality of the respective statutes consists in
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individuals.61
B. The Minimum Coverage Provision and the
Activity/Inactivity Distinction

Notwithstanding the "New Federalism" of the Rehnquist and Roberts
Courts, at the outset of the ACA litigation the MCP appeared to be on
solid constitutional footing. Whether one defines the relevant market
broadly, as the consumption of health care; somewhat more narrowly, as
the financing of health care; or still more discretely, as health care
insurance, each affects interstate commerce in a proximate and palpable
way. Indeed, the economic consequences of being uninsured would
seem markedly more substantial than either gun possession or gendermotivated violence. In addition, as the Court explained in Gonzalez v.
Raich, Congress can regulate "purely intrastate activity that is not itself
'commercial,' . . . if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of
activity would undercut the regulation of the [relevant] interstate
market. . . . "62 And in fact, all acknowledged that two of the ACA's
key elements-the so-called "guaranteed issue" and "community rating"
provisions-would be ineffectual unless they were coupled with a
requirement that people without insurance purchase it. Furthermore,
even in the post-Lopez era, the Court has continued to affirm that
reviewing courts owe congressional enactments great deference. "In
assessing the scope of Congress' authority under the Commerce
Clause," the Court explained in 2005, "we stress that the task before us
is a modest one." The Court need not conclude that the regulated
activities, "taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate
their "commandeering" of state officials and legislative processes in the implementation of a federal
regulatory scheme. New York, 505 U.S. at 176 ("'[T]he Act commandeers the legislative processes of
the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program,' an outcome
that has never been understood to lie within the authority conferred upon Congress by the Constitution."
(citation omitted) (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mineral and Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264,
288 (1981))); Printz,521 U.S. at 914, 925, 929 (discussing federal commandeering of state officials and
governments).
61. New York, 505 U.S. at 165 (The Framers "opted for a Constitution in which Congress would
exercise its legislative authority directly over individuals rather than over States .... ); Printz, 521 U.S.
at 919-20 ("[T]he Framers rejected the concept of a central government that would act upon and
through the States, and instead designed a system in which the State and Federal Governments would
exercise concurrent authority over the people-who were, in Hamilton's words, 'the only proper objects
of the government."').
62. Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 18 (2005). As Justice Scalia explained in his concurring
opinion, "[tihe regulation of an intrastate activity may be essential to a comprehensive regulation of
interstate commerce even though the intrastate activity does not itself 'substantially affect' interstate
commerce." Id. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring). Moreover, the "substantial affects" doctrine extends to
"even noneconomic local activity if that regulation is a necessary part of a more general regulation of
interstate commerce." Id.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

15

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 1

702

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 82

commerce in fact, but only whether a 'rational basis' exists for so
concluding." 63
The ACA plaintiffs navigated this inhospitable doctrinal terrain 64 by
advancing a limiting principle that focused, not on the noneconomic
nature of the regulated conduct-i.e., being uninsured-but on the
apparent absence of any regulable activity. The Commerce Clause
authorizes Congress "to 'regulate' extant commerce," argued the state
respondents, but not "to bring commerce into existence." 65 Congress
cannot "compel individuals to engage in commerce so that Congress has
something to regulate." 66 Under this limitation, congressional authority
extends only to people who are presently active in the relevant
commercial market. Because the uninsured are not active in the market
for health insurance, and thus not engaged in the commerce regulated by
the MCP, they are beyond the reach of the commerce power.
Two features of this ultimately successful limiting principle bear
special notice. First, it is novel. It is true, of course, as the challengers
observed, that many of the leading Commerce Clause cases describe the
commerce power as reaching economic "activity." As Mark Hall points
out, however, "' [a]ctivity' appears in various permissive or limiting
phrases only because activity was what Congress actually regulated in
these cases." 67 There is no reason to read the Court's references to
"activity" in cases like Lopez and Morrison, where the constitutional
challenge turned instead on whether the regulated activity was
sufficiently "economic," to imply that economic "inactivity" lies beyond
the scope of the commerce power.
Second, the principle was urged as an intrinsic constraint on
congressional authority that was anchored in the text of Article I and
structural constitutional values of federalism, rather than an extrinsic,
"affirmative" prohibition rooted in an individual right. Though judges,
policymakers, and legal scholars differ over the breadth of Congress'
power to regulate interstate commerce, all understand that the scope of
63. Raich, 545 U.S. at 22. See also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 (Since 1937, the Court has
"undertaken to decide whether a rational basis existed for concluding that a regulated activity
sufficiently affected interstate commerce."); United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1957 (2010)
("[T]he relevant inquiry is simply 'whether the means chosen are "reasonably adapted" to the attainment
of a legitimate end under the commerce power' or under other powers that the Constitution grants
Congress the authority to implement." (quoting Raich, 545 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment)).
64. The apparent weakness of the of the challengers' position under existing Commerce Clause
doctrine was well canvassed in Hall, supra note 14.
65. Brief for State Respondents on the Minimum Coverage Provision at 15, Nat'l Fed'n of
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (Nos. 11-393, 11-398, 11-400), 2012 WL 392550, at
*15 [hereinafter Brief for State Respondents].
66. Id. at 16.
67. Hall, supra note 14, at 1831. See also Baker, supra note 14, at 280-82.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol82/iss3/1

16

Lindsay: Federalism and Phantom Economic Rights in NFIB v. Sebelius

2014] FEDERALISM AND PHANTOM ECONOMIC RIGHTS INNVFIB V SEBELFUS 703

that authority is derived from Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.
Even as the outer boundary of the commerce power has migrated,
sometimes fitfully, over time, the basic terms with which the boundary
line is fixed-for example, the meaning of "commerce" or the requisite
degree of connection to an interstate market-inhere in the original
grant of authority. In short, the MCP's challengers and, ultimately, five
Supreme Court Justices, endorsed the notion that the activity/inactivity
distinction is inherent in the constitutional grant of authority. 68
A rights-based constraint on regulatory authority, by contrast, is
understood to be extrinsic to the authority itself, in the sense that it can
invalidate a regulation even though the government otherwise possesses
the authority to regulate in a given domain. Even when Congress
(typically under the commerce or taxing powers) or a state legislature
(under its police power) has broad authority to regulate a particular class
of economic or criminal activities, the regulation will nevertheless be
subject to strict constitutional scrutiny if it interferes with either an
express constitutional right or a right otherwise deemed
"fundamental." 69 Since the New Deal, the Court has consistently
refused to recognize a fundamental right to economic liberty. 70 And in
fact, the state plaintiffs initially auditioned a Fifth Amendment
substantive due process argument, citing individual "'liberty interests in
the freedom to eschew entering into a contract. . "'7 In dismissing
that challenge, the district court noted that while such a claim "would
68. Professors Rosen and Schmidt very profitably frame the plaintiff's conceptual challenge as
that of translating popular constitutional opposition to the ACA, which was preoccupied almost
exclusively with the threat to individual liberty posed by the unchecked expansion of highly coercive
federal power, into the doctrinal terms in which the legal challenge would be decided-namely,
enumerated powers and constitutional structure. The activity/inactivity distinction was the solution to
that challenge. See Rosen & Schmidt, supra note 16.
69. Nonenumerated fundamental rights are typically protected under the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993) (describing the
"line of cases which interprets the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' guarantee of 'due process of law'
to include a substantive component, which forbids the government to infringe certain 'fundamental'
liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling state interest"). See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (identifying a
fundamental right to marry); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to privacy); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to have children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right
of parents to direct the education of their children); Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)
(right to refuse medical treatment).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 148 (1937) (rejecting
substantive due process challenge to economic regulation); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc.,
348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) ("The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions,
because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.").
71. Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1161 (N.D. Fla.
2010) (quoting Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 43, Florida
v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (No. 3:10-cv-91
RV/EMT), 2010 WL 3163990, at *43).
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have found Constitutional support ... in the years prior to .. . the mid1930s, when the Due Process Clause was interpreted to reach economic
rights and liberties, '[t]he doctrine that prevailed in Lochner ... has long
since been discarded."' 72 That the challengers chose not to press the
issue on appeal is unsurprising, given Lochner's prominent place in the
American constitutional anticanon.73
III. ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND THE SCOPE OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY
DURING THE "LOCHNER ERA"

Today, more than seventy-five years after the Supreme Court
abandoned Lochner as a legal precedent,74 the decision continues to
occupy a central place in the nation's ongoing debate over the proper
scope of judicial review. As President Obama and Solicitor General
Verrilli's imputations of "Lochnerism" to the MCP's opponents
suggest,75 Lochner remains a vital symbol of politically motivated
judicial activism. The origin of this rhetorical tradition lies in Justice
Holmes' celebrated dissent in Lochner itself, chiding the majority for
deciding the case based on its preferred "economic theory" rather than
constitutional principle, and thereby "pervert[ing]" the Fourteenth
Amendment to "prevent the natural outcome of dominant opinion."76
Holmes' dissent inaugurated what scholars have labeled the
"progressive"
interpretation
of Lochner-era police powers
jurisprudence.
In its starkest terms, the progressive interpretation
holds that judges steeped in laissez-faire economic theory-or, as
72. Id. at 1161 (quoting Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963)).
73. Jamal Greene, who (very plausibly) views the substantive due process argument as stronger
than the Article I argument, attributes the ACA challenger's decision to not press the issue on appeal at
least in part to political considerations. In addition to the strategic risk of associating their challenge
with a generally disreputable legal precedent, Greene explains, a challenge to the individual mandate
could have harmed Mitt Romney's presidential candidacy by implicitly condemning "the similar statelevel mandate that Mitt Romney signed into law as governor of Massachusetts." Jamal Greene, What
the New Deal Settled, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 265, 267 (2012). So, too, Greene speculates, might
"opponents of the mandate . .. have been reluctant to affiliate their arguments with the Court's
reproductive freedom precedents...." Id.
74. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding the constitutionality of a
Washington state minimum-wage law).
75. See supra note 12.
76. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes' dissent is
rightly understood as a clarion call for judicial restraint, and defense of "the right of a majority to
embody their opinions in law." Id. at 75. A constitution, he explained, "is made for people of
fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar, or
novel, and even shocking, ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes
embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States." Id. at 76.
77. On the generative role that Holmes' dissent played in the development of the progressive
interpretation of Lochner, see BERNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 40-55 (describing progressive jurists and
legal scholars' lionization of Holmes and adulation for his Lochner dissent).
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Holmes put it, "Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics"-who identified
with the nation's capitalist class and opposed any governmental
interference in the private marketplace, were determined to scuttle
legislative efforts to mitigate the socially destructive consequences of
the industrial labor system. In order to mask this illegitimate intrusion
into the domain of the legislatures, the progressive interpretation runs,
these judicial activists invented novel economic rights-most
importantly "liberty of contract"-that they engrafted upon the
Fourteenth Amendment through the intellectually dubious doctrine of
Although subsequent generations of
substantive due process.
scholarship have debunked some of its key premises and conclusions,7 9
the progressive interpretation of Lochner continues to stalk appellate
briefs, constitutional law courses, and popular legal discourse as a
cautionary tale of judicial transgression. As the ACA litigation
illustrates, the charge of "Lochnerism" serves as a convenient, if often
intellectually clumsy, weapon with which to bludgeon those bringing
constitutional challenges to economic regulations.so
This Part argues that, while the Lochner-era Court did embed in the
Fourteenth Amendment a novel and expansive right to economic liberty,
it resembled little the constitutional trump against economic regulation
that the slogan "liberty of contract" is often understood to imply.8 1
Notwithstanding Lochner's enduring reputation as an act of naked
78. See, e.g., ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTTUDES OF
THE BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895 (1960); CARL BRENT SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT 393, 520-21 (1943); BENJAMIN R. Twiss, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION: How
LAISSEZ FAIRE CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT (1942); Max Lerner, The Supreme Court and American
Capitalism,42 YALE L. J. 668 (1933).
79. Over the past several decades, legal historians and constitutional scholars have developed a
rich and compelling revision of the progressive narrative that substantially undermines the imputation of
ideologically motivated judicial activism. In particular, scholars have identified a host of principled, if
sometimes anachronistic, bases for Lochner-era police powers jurisprudence, including the Jacksonian
aversion to "class legislation," see GILLMAN, supra note 19, at 19-60; Benedict, supra note 19; the
adulation of individual economic liberty as a constitutive element of human freedom in the antislavery
movement and following emancipation, see William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities ofFree Labor: Labor
and the Law in the Gilded Age, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 767, 783 (1985); William E. Nelson, The Impact of
the Antislavery Movement upon Styles ofJudicialReasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV.
L. REV. 513 (1974); and the nation's traditional social contract vision of political membership, see
OWEN M. FISS, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: VOLUME 8, TROUBLED
BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910, at 157-59, 164 (Stanley N. Katz ed., 1993).
80. As Professor Gary Rowe writes, "avoiding 'Lochner's error' remains the central
obsession ... of contemporary constitutional law.... To Lochner is to sin, egregiously." Rowe, supra
note 12, at 223. For helpful discussions of the "career" of Lochner in the post-New Deal era, see David
E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revisited: Lochner and the Origins of FundamentalRights
Constitutionalism,92 GEO L.J. 1 (2003); BERNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 108-24; Cushman, supra note
19.
81. On this point, this Article joins a substantial body of historical scholarship challenging the
progressive critique of Lochner as an instrument of "laissez-faire constitutionalism." See supra note 79
and accompanying text.
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judicial transgression, the meaning of constitutional economic liberty in
the Lochner era, as well as its "lessons" for our own time, are both more
subtle and more penetrating than either supporters or critics of NFIB's
Commerce Clause majority have realized. The affirmative "right" to
contractual liberty at work in Lochner served not as a constitutional
trump, but rather as a trigger for heightened judicial scrutiny of
legislative means and ends. The statute at issue-a maximum hours law
for bakers-was ultimately invalid not merely because it interfered with
that right, but because, in the Court's view, it failed to serve any of the
legitimate ends of state police power-namely, the protection of the
public health or general welfare. The specific constraint that the Court
placed on the authority of the New York legislature thus closely tracked
the long-standing prohibition on "class legislation." 82 In this respect, the
"right" to individual economic liberty served as a convenient, politically
and ideologically resonant trigger for the Court's selectively aggressive
scrutiny of the challenged regulation, but it did not operationalize
conceptually novel limits on the exercise of the police power. Such
limits would continue to be drawn according to the constitutive terms of
the police power itself, rather than the right to economic liberty
supposed to be demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus
understood, the Lochner-erasubstantive due process cases illustrate how
constraints on legislative authority that are rooted in economic rights
and constraints on legislative authority that are intrinsic to the authority
itself necessarily operate in dynamic relationship to one another. In this
reading, the Lochner-era cases are exemplars of how the Court adapts
the scope of both state and federal legislative authority in the service of
economic liberty. Indeed, this is the basic blueprint for modem
"fundamental rights" analysis. 83 Reading NFIB v. Sebelius through this
historical lens provides an important alternative analytical framework to
the structure/rights dichotomy advanced by the Chief Justice and joint
82. For the leading account of the "anticlass legislation" interpretation of Lochner-era police
powers jurisprudence, see GILLMAN, supranote 19.
83. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. As Professor Bernstein has persuasively argued,
the Lochner-era Court's recognition of an individual right to economic liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments played a generative role in the subsequent
development of more robust constitutional protections of civil liberties. Bernstein demonstrates how the
Court extended Fourteenth Amendment protection to certain noneconomic fundamental liberties,
including the right to direct the education of one's children, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
(striking down a state law prohibiting the instruction of pre-high school students in a foreign language),
and the right to free expression, see Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (recognizing that
"freedom of speech and of the Press" were among the "fundamental personal rights and 'liberties'
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"), against the state police power.
See BERNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 90-96, 99-102. See also David E. Bernstein, The Conservative
Origins of Strict Scrutiny, 19 GEO. MASON L. REv. 861 (2012) (arguing that modern fundamental rights
analysis owes as much to the Progressive-Era Supreme Court's liberty of contract jurisprudence as to
the more celebrated free speech dissents of Justices Holmes and Brandeis in the 1920s).
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dissenters.
This Part proceeds in three Subparts. Subpart A analyzes the
emergence in the 1870s and 1880s of a constitutionally novel
understanding of "liberty" and "property" in the dissenting and
concurring opinions of Justices Stephen Field and Joseph Bradley. It
argues that, although Justices Field and Bradley theorized a Fourteenth
Amendment "right of free labor" that would, decades later, provide the
jurisprudential foundation for the substantive due process right to
"liberty of contract," they were less concerned with individual economic
liberty per se than with prohibiting legislatures from extending special
privileges to a preferred class of citizens. Constitutional economic
liberty thus functions in their opinions as a convenient jurisdictional
hook through which the federal courts might enforce constraints on state
authority that were intrinsic to the police power. Subpart B analyzes the
Court's adoption of a Fourteenth Amendment right to economic liberty
during the so-called Lochner era. It argues that, even as the Court's
desire to repel legislative compulsion in the private labor market
triggered at times aggressive scrutiny of economic regulations, the
specific limits it placed on the state police power were drawn, again,
according to the constitutive terms of the police power itself-namely,
the meaning of "public health" and "general welfare"-rather than the
economic right. The 1908 case of Adair v. UnitedStates illustrates how
the Court deployed a substantive due process right to economic liberty
to define the scope of not only the state police power, but also, and in
virtually identical terms, Congress' authority to regulate under the
Commerce Clause. Finally, Subpart C explains that when the New Deal
Court rejected the idea of "fundamental" economic rights and, in the
Commerce Clause cases, the manufacturing/commerce
and
direct/indirect effects distinctions, it replaced those doctrines with a
unified framework for reviewing state and federal economic regulations,
premised on a strong presumption of constitutionality.
A. The FourteenthAmendment and the Constitutionalizationof
Economic Liberty Before Lochner

The jurisprudential foundation of Lochner-era constitutional
economic liberty was laid several decades before the Lochner decision,
in the years following the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. 84 in
84. In fact, depending on how one understands Lochner's "foundation," it goes back further than
that. This Subpart emphasizes the development in the post-Civil War era of an expansive,
constitutionally novel understanding of "liberty" and "property." But the origins of the notion that the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment affords certain substantive, in addition to procedural,
protections against legislative interference with an individual's liberty or property precede the Civil
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separate dissenting opinions in the landmark 1873 Slaughter-House
Cases,5 Justices Stephen Field and Joseph Bradley famously argued
that, in granting a single corporation, the Crescent City Company, a
twenty-five year butchering monopoly, the Louisiana legislature had
deprived butchers excluded from the monopoly of their privileges and
immunities as citizens of the United States, in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.8 6 After the Louisiana legislature subsequently
revoked the butchering monopoly, the Crescent City Company brought
suit, claiming that, because it had expended great sums on a vast
slaughterhouse and stockyard in reliance on its exclusive right, the
legislative charter had taken on the character of an "irrepealable
contract."87 The Court unanimously upheld the repeal in Butchers'
Union v. Crescent City Co.,8 8 but Justices Field and Bradley wrote
separate concurring opinions in order to further theorize the Fourteenth
Amendment right to individual economic liberty. In these four opinions,
Justices Field and Bradley planted the seeds of constitutional economic
liberty that would, decades later, blossom into the substantive due
process right to liberty of contract. This Subpart argues that we should
understand the constitutional "right of free labor" advanced by Field and
Bradley less as a defense of economic liberty per se than a jurisdictional
hook that enabled the federal courts to enforce conditions on state
legislative authority that were intrinsic to the police power itselfnamely, that regulations of liberty or property serve the generalwelfare,
rather than the narrow interests of a favored class.
The Slaughterhouse Cases marked the Supreme Court's first
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. A five-Justice majority
concluded that the Amendment had not made the Supreme Court "a
perpetual censor upon all legislation of the States, on the civil rights of

War. Dred Scott v. Sanford represents only the most infamous example of protecting a "substantive"
property right-the right to own slaves-under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See
Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). See generally MARK A. GRABER, DRED ScorT
AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITuTIONAL EVIL (2006); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis
and the Rise ofJudicial Elections and JudicialReview, 123 HARv. L. REV. 1061, 1126 (2010). By the
time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, explains Ryan Williams, the phrase "due process
of law" in both state and federal constitutions "had developed ... well-established substantive
connotations as both a prohibition of legislative interference with vested rights and as a guarantee of
general and impartial laws." Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause,
120 YALE L.J. 408, 416 (2011).
85. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
86. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 83-111 (Field, J., dissenting); id at 111-24 (Bradley, J.,
dissenting).
87. Butchers' Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock
Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746, 749 (1884).
88. Specifically, the Court held that a legislature "cannot by any contract divest itself' of its
police authority to protect public health, order, and morals. Id. at 752.
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their own citizens . .,89 Justices Field and Bradley argued strenuously
in dissent that Section 1 had in fact upended the nation's federalist
structure of "double citizenship" 90 in order "to provide National security
against violation by the States of the fundamental rights of the citizen." 9 '
What, exactly, were the fundamental rights of American citizenship?
Justices Field and Bradley agreed that when the Declaration of
Independence proclaimed "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" to
be among the "inalienable rights" endowed in all men by "their
Creator," it was affirming "the fundamental rights which can only be
taken away by due process of law, and which can only be interfered
with ... by lawful regulations necessary or proper for the mutual good
of all . . ..

92

Although Justices Field and Bradley differed sharply with the
Slaughterhouse majority over the extent to which the Fourteenth
Amendment had unsettled the nation's traditional federalism, their
contention that the Privileges and Immunities Clause authorized the
federal courts to vindicate the fundamental rights of national citizenship
against hostile state legislatures was not especially remarkable.93 Their
innovation consisted, rather, in the breadth of meaning they ascribed to
the phrase "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."9 4 The right "to
adopt such calling, profession, or trade" was "an essential part of that
liberty which it is the object of government to protect," Justice Bradley
urged, "and a calling, when chosen, is a man's property and right.
89. Slaughter-HouseCases, 83 U.S. at 78.
90. Id. at 121 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 122. Before the adoption of the Amendment, Bradley explained, the Constitution
afforded "no machinery . .. for any interference by the General Government between a State and its
citizens. Rather, the protection of the citizen in the enjoyment of his fuindamental privileges and
immunities ... was largely left to State laws and State courts." Id. at 121. Field agreed that Section 1
had "place[d] the common rights of American citizens under the protection of the National
government." Id at 93 (Field, J., dissenting). As a result, the "fundamental rights, privileges, and
immunities which belong to him as a free man and a free citizen, now belong to him as a citizen of the
United States, and are not dependent upon his citizenship of any State." Id. at 95.
92. Id. at 116 (Bradley, J., dissenting). The Fourteenth Amendment did not itself create
fundamental rights of national citizenship, Field and Bradley maintained. Rather, the privileges and
immunities referred to in Section 1 consisted of certain "primordial," Butchers' Union, Ill U.S. at 765
(Bradley, J., concurring), "traditionary rights," Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 114 (Bradley, J.,
dissenting), that had been "wrested from English sovereigns," id, over the course of centuries, and thus
existed independently of any specific constitutional provision. Those fundamental rights of citizenship
had then found expression in the great monuments to English liberty-the Magna Charta, the common
law, the English Bill of Rights, and, most importantly, that "new evangel of liberty," the American
Declaration of Independence. Butchers' Union, 111 U.S. at 756 (Field, J., concurring).
93. See generally WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL
PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988); GARRETT EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE FIGHT FOR EQUAL RIGHTS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA (2006).
94. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 116 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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Liberty and property are not protected where these rights are arbitrarily
assailed."9 5 Justice Field agreed, in a passage that would become an
indispensable touchstone for late-nineteenth century state high courts
reviewing legislative interference with individual economic liberty:
The equality of right .. . in the lawful pursuits of life . .. is the

distinguishing privilege of citizens of the United States. To them,
everywhere, all pursuits, all professions, all avocations are open without
other restrictions than such as are imposed equally upon all others ....
This is the fundamental idea upon which our institutions rest, and unless
adhered to in the legislation of the country our government will be a
republic only in name.
The fourteenth amendment ... makes it
essential .. .that this equality of right should be respected .... [B]y [the
butchering monopoly] the right of free labor, one of the most sacred and
imprescriptible rights of man, is violated.96
Of what, exactly, did the "sacred and imprescriptible" right of "free
labor" consist? Justice Field quoted at length one of the seminal texts of
classical liberal political economy, Adam Smith's The Wealth of

Nations:
"The property which every man has in his own labor," says Adam Smith,
"as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most
sacred and inviolable. The patrimony of the poor man lies in the strength
and dexterity of his own hands; and to hinder him from employing his
strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper, without injury to
his neighbor, is a plain violation of this most sacred property. It is a
manifest encroachment upon the just liberty both of the workman and of

95. Id.

96. Id. at 109-10. In the 1870s, a time of rapid industrialization in the northern states, the
meaning of "free labor" was an ideologically freighted subject of social and political debate. As the
traditional centerpiece of republican political theory, the ideal of personal "independence" had long been
embodied in the figure of the self-employed farmer or artisan, whose ownership of productive property
served as a guarantee of economic self-sufficiency-the essential requisite for virtuous citizenship. To
labor for a wage, by contrast, was to subject one's personal autonomy, including one's economic
livelihood and even political will, to the authority of an employer. See generallyForbath,supra note 79;
LAWRENCE B. GLICKMAN, A LIVING WAGE: AMERICAN WORKERS AND THE MAKING OF CONSUMER
SOCIETY 22-24 (1997); DAVID MONTGOMERY, BEYOND EQUALTY: LABOR AND THE RADICAL
REPUBLICANS, 1862-1872, at 30-33 (1967); AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT:
WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 9-10 (1998).

For Field, the New Orleans butchers were exemplars of this traditional vision of free labor,
struggling against a legislative monopoly that threatened to deprive them of their independence and
reduce them to the condition of mere wage laborers. By championing the butchers' "equality of
right... [in] the ordinary avocations of life," Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 109 (Field, J.,
dissenting), Field was thus attempting to vindicate their republican independence at a moment when the
industrial revolution was fast transforming small farmers and skilled craftsmen into propertlyless wage
earners. See Forbath, supra note 79, at 773-79; Matthew J. Lindsay, In Search of "Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism," 123 HARv. L. REv. F. 55, 70-71 (2010).
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those who might be disposed to employ him."97
The most important jurisprudential legacy of Justice Field's opinion lies
in this radical redefinition of constitutional "liberty" and "property."
For Justice Field, "property" encompassed not only land and tangible
goods, but anything with market value; "liberty" referred not only to
physical freedom, but freedom to act in the marketplace. 98 This was a
vision of individual economic liberty adapted not to a republic of
independent artisans and craftsmen, but to the propertyless hirelings
who increasingly populated the nation's swelling industrial labor
force-men whose economic personhood consisted entirely in their
capacity to alienate their labor for a price. 99 Justices Field and Bradley's
recognition of a constitutional right of property in, and liberty to dispose
of, one's labor distinguishes their opinions from the constitutional
protections of liberty and property that came before. It was this theory
that would later ripen into "liberty of contract."
Even as Justices Field and Bradley characterized the right to pursue
one's calling as an "inviolable" or "sacred and imprescriptible" privilege
of U.S. citizenship, however, the key issue, writes Howard Gillman, was
not "the importance of the liberty but the character of the legislation:

did it actually promote the good of the public or was it designed to
promote the special interests of some favored groups?"100 For Justices
Field and Bradley, a citizen's Fourteenth Amendment "right to free
labor" was no citadel of economic liberty. Rather, that right protected
him only against "discriminating and partial enactments, favoring some
to the impairment of the rights of others."' 01 It thus served as a
97. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 110 n.39 (Field, J., dissenting) (quoting ADAM SMITH,
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776)). See also Butchers' Union, I l U.S. at 757 (Field, J., concurring).
98. Field and Bradley were joined in this project by the jurist and treatise writer Thomas Cooley,
whose influential Treatise on ConstitutionalLimitations, first published shortly before the ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment, argued that state due process clauses substantively limited the authority of
legislatures to regulate common law property rights. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE
AMERICAN UNION 351-61 (5th ed. 1883).

99. It was also a vision of economic liberty that resonated with the great moral and political
cause of the previous generation-the abolition of slavery. Abolitionists had celebrated the voluntary
sale of one's labor as the antithesis of slavery. Slave emancipation and the adoption of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, securing the right to contract for the sale of one's labor as an essential right of citizenship,
enshrined this vision into law. See generally STANLEY, supra note 96, at 1-59; Lindsay, supra note 96,
at 71 n.90, 72 n.91.
100. Howard Gillman, PreferredFreedoms: The ProgressiveExpansion of State Power and the
Rise of Modern Civil Liberties Jurisprudence,47 POL. RES. Q. 623, 633-34 (1994).
101. Butchers' Union, Ill U.S. at 758 (Field, J., concurring). And in fact, leading scholars of
Lochner-era police powers jurisprudence have interpreted Field and Bradley's opinions in this light. In
particular, scholars have traced Lochner-erajudicial scrutiny of economic regulations to the Jacksonian
opposition to special legislative privileges. See, e.g., GILLMAN, supra note 19, at 64-76. Intellectualbiographical studies of leading late-nineteenth century figures in the constitutionalization of individual
economic liberty persuasively present jurists such as Stephen Field and Thomas Cooley not as laissez-
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constitutional bulwark against the "arbitrary invasion by state authority
of the . . . right to pursue happiness unrestrained, except by just, equal,
and impartial laws."l 0 2 It was not the regulation of butchering per se
that troubled Justices Field and Bradley, or even the legislature's
interference with the economic freedom of individual butchers; but
rather its unjust, "partial," "arbitrary" discrimination against a
disfavored class of butchers.!0 3
And indeed, the New Orleans
butchering monopoly was widely viewed at the time as an act of naked
legislative favoritism."'"
Understood as a demand for legislative
impartiality, the Fourteenth Amendment right to economic liberty
appears not as constitutional trump against state economic regulation,
but rather as a convenient jurisdictional hook through which the federal
courts might enforce constraints on legislative authority that were
intrinsic to the police power itself.

Although the police power has never lent itself to easy definition, it
was generally understood to encompass, in the words of Massachusetts
Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw, "all manner of wholesome and reasonable
laws . .. as [the legislature] shall judge to be for the good and welfare of
the
commonwealth."' 0 5
Because
"[a]ll
property. . . [was]
derived. . . from the government," Shaw explained, it was "held subject
faire ideologues, but rather as principled neo-Jacksonians, committed to the defense of the general good
against the corrupting influence of powerful economic interests. See, e.g., Alan Jones, Thomas M
Cooley and "Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism": A Reconsideration, 53 J. AM. HIST. 751 (1967);
McCurdy, supra note 19.
102. Butchers' Union, I11 U.S. at 759 (Field, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 758. Justice Bradley agreed:
[T]he ordinary pursuits of life, forming the large mass of industrial avocations, are and ought to
be free and open to all, subject only to such general regulations, applying equally to all, as the
general good may demand; and the grant to the favored few of a monopoly in any of these
common callings is necessarily an outrage upon the liberty of the citizen as exhibited in one of
its most important aspects-the liberty of pursuit.
Id. at 763 (Bradley, J., concurring). And in fact, this formulation reflected the mode of protecting
individual liberty against governmental encroachment that had prevailed throughout the nineteenth
century. Like the federalists of the founding era, many of whom only reluctantly acceded to the addition
of a Bill of Rights to the Constitution, nineteenth-century judges believed that the best way to protect
fundamental rights and liberties was to confine the powers of government to a relatively narrow, welldefined, and judicially enforceable set of permissible legislative ends. In the case of the federal
Congress, those ends were specifically identified, or enumerated, in Article I of the U.S. Constitution.
In the case of the state legislatures, those ends were inherent in the police power itself, and required no
textual basis other than the common law decisions through which the contours of the police power had
been drawn. Under this regime, explains Howard Gillman, "the liberties of citizens were safeguarded,
not by the identification and protection of preferred freedoms"-that is, certain affirmative, fundamental
constitutional rights-"but by a judicial inquiry into whether a piece of legislation was sufficiently
general and whether it was dictated by public necessity." Gillman, supra note 100, at 631.
104. On the political background of the legislation, see RONALD M. LABBE & JONATHAN LURIE,
THE SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES: REGULATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

(2005).
105. Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53, 85 (Mass. 1851).
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to those general regulations, which are necessary to the common good
and general welfare."'o Two aspects of the police power bear special
emphasis. First, the rights of private property were subordinate to the
authority of the state to engage in reasonable regulations. Second, and
most importantly for present purposes, in order for a regulatory
"limitation" on the rights of private property to qualify as "reasonable,"
it had to serve the "common good and general welfare." Along with
"public health," these constituted the finite universe of the police
power's legitimate ends. As such, they operated, much like the
congressional ends enumerated in Article I, as intrinsic limits on the
legislative authority of the states. It was these limits that Justices Field
and Bradley, with their condemnation of "partial" legislation and
defense of the butchers' "equality of right," were seeking to enforce.' 0 7
The seeds planted by Justices Field and Bradley began to bear fruit
almost immediately. First, in the 1880s several state supreme courts
drew inspiration from their opinions in striking down state labor
regulations. 0 8 Next, in 1896 a unanimous United States Supreme Court
endorsed, in dicta, an expansive definition of the "liberty" protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.109 The doctrinal
106. Id.
107. Indeed, they denied any intention to "limit the subjects upon which States can legislate,"
Butchers' Union, 111 U.S. at 759 (Field, J., concurring), and insisted that the Fourteenth Amendment
had left undisturbed their authority "to promote health, good order, and peace, to develop their
resources, enlarge their industries, and advance their prosperity." Id.
108. The New York Court of Appeals' opinion in In re Jacobs, invalidating a state law prohibiting
the manufacture of cigars in certain tenement houses, exemplifies the new property and liberty: "The
constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law may
be violated without the physical taking of property . . . ." In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 105 (N.Y. 1885).
Any law that "destroys it or its value, or takes away any of its essential attributes" deprives a person of
his property. Id "Liberty, in its broad sense as understood in this country," explained the court, "means
the right, not only of freedom from actual servitude, imprisonment or restraint, but the right of one to
use his faculties in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his livelihood in any lawful
calling, and to pursue any lawful trade or avocation." Id. at 106. See also Godcharles v. Wigeman, 6 A.
354, 356 (Pa. 1886) (striking down a state law requiring that iron workers be paid in cash at regular
intervals as an unconstitutional attempt to "prevent persons who are sui juris from making their own
contracts" that was "not only degrading to his manhood, but subversive of his rights as a citizen of the
United States"); State v. Goodwill, 10 S.E. 285, 286 (W. Va. 1889) (striking down a state law
forbidding payment in company script on the ground that it interfered with the "liberty" of every man
"'to pursue any lawful trade or avocation'). See generally Lindsay, supranote 96; supranotes 95-100
and accompanying text.
109. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1896) (holding that a Louisiana law forbidding
residents from purchasing marine insurance from out-of-state companies deprived the defendant of his
liberty without due process of law). Although the holding ofAllgeyer was quite narrow, dicta in Justice
Peckham's opinion for the Court was potentially far-reaching. He wrote:
The 'liberty' mentioned in [the fourteenth] amendment means, not only the right of the citizen to
be free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed
to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use
them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful
calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation; and for that purpose to enter into all contracts
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table was set for the adoption of a new constitutional right to economic
liberty.
B. "Liberty of Contract" and the Limits ofLegislative Authority
Duringthe "Lochner Era"
Long-standing use of the phrase "liberty of contract" as a shorthand
for the "rule" of Lochner has obscured the meaning of Justice
Peckham's majority opinion. In striking down a New York law
restricting the hours of labor for bakers, the Lochner majority did indeed
endorse an expansive, constitutionally novel definition of "liberty" and
"property." But that right did not consist of a prohibition against state
interference with private economic transactions, as "liberty of contract"
is often understood to imply. This Subpart joins a substantial body of
scholarship 1 o reinterpreting the substantive due process right to
economic liberty not as a trump against state economic regulation, but
rather as a jurisdictional hook through which federal courts could
enforce conditions on legislative authority that were intrinsic to the
police power itself-specifically, that police regulations serve the public
health and general welfare. When we step back from the remarkably
durable mythology of "laissez-faire constitutionalism" that surrounds
Lochner and instead read Justice Peckham's majority opinion on its own
terms, we find a far more textured account of constitutional liberty and
governmental authority informed by long-standing judicial values. First
and foremost, Justice Peckham's opinion reflects the traditional
prohibition on "class legislation" discussed in the previous Subpart,
which common law courts had enforced intermittently for several
decades. In this respect, we might understand the substantive due
process right to economic liberty as an artifact of long-standing police
power categories-as Professor Howard Gillman has described it, the
residuum of individual liberty that is "left over after government has
reached the limits of its authorized power.""' Yet Justice Peckham's
opinion also reflects a broader, more historically specific impulse to
buffer the economic prerogatives of individuals engaged in "private"
which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying to a successful conclusion the
purposes above mentioned.
Id. at 589. The Court's description of the "liberty" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment is notable
on two counts. First, following the Slaughter-House Cases majority's very narrow construction of the
"privileges and immunities" of citizenship, the constitutional right to individual economic liberty took up
residence instead in the Due Process Clause, where it would remain until 1937. Second, the citizen's
right to pursue a lawful calling earlier elaborated by Field and Bradley here swells to include his freedom
to "enter into all contracts" directed toward that end. Id.
I10. See supra notes 19 and 79.
111. Gillman, supra note 100, at 625.
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economic transactions from what the majority viewed as the runaway
police power of the states. In this respect, the right takes on a more
libertarian cast, as an affirmative, extrinsic constraint on governmental
authority rooted in natural, prepolitical rights." 2
This Subpart uses Lochner and a number of other early twentiethcentury substantive due process cases to illustrate that the constitutional
right to economic liberty, on the one hand, and intrinsic limits on both
state and federal legislative authority, on the other, are deeply
interconnected modes of constraining the powers of government. As
this Article will argue in Part IV, this understanding of Lochner
fundamentally unsettles the dichotomy drawn by Chief Justice Roberts
and the joint dissenters in NFIB v. Sebelius, between intrinsic and rightsbased constraints on legislative authority.

As a preliminary matter, it is important to situate the Lochner Court's
defense of economic liberty within its historical context. In the halfcentury following the end of the Civil War, Americans experienced a
remarkable revolution in their social and economic order, as their
traditional, if idealized, republic of independent farmers and artisans
was transformed into an industrial society characterized by large
corporate employers, the deskilling of labor and the ascendency of an
intensively competitive wage system. In response to this industrial
reorganization of American life and labor, wage workers and their allies
in progressive reform movements prevailed on state legislatures to
intercede in the terms of employment to prescribe certain basic
guarantees and protections for workers, such as requiring payment of
wages in cash and at regular intervals, or establishing minimum wages
and maximum hours. Such demands for "special protection from the
coercive effects of a corporate industrial economy," writes Professor
Gillman, "constituted a direct challenge to an established tenet of
political legitimacy"-the principle of state neutrality.1 3 That neutrality
principle was embodied in the constitutive terms of the police powerspecifically, the requirement that regulatory interference with individual
liberty or property serve the public good and general welfare, rather than
the "partial" interests of a favored class.
112. The Lochner opinion itself affords ample support for each of these interpretations. For
example, Professor Bernstein acknowledges that "judicial hostility to class legislation" informed the
Court's review of labor legislation, but maintains that Peckham's opinion focused primarily "on the
right to liberty of contract, and relegated the more egalitarian concerns" rooted in the principle of state
neutrality to an "oblique aside." BERNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 16.
113. GILLMAN, supranote 19, at 14.
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As heirs to the Jacksonian opposition to special legislative privileges,
Lochner-era courts thus understood their critical duty to be that of
distinguishing between the vast majority of state police regulations that
were legitimately directed toward the public health and welfare, and the
illegitimate minority that were intended to serve the interests of a
narrow class. Judges reared on a pre-industrial understanding of state
neutrality in which the market itself functioned as a neutral arbiter of
economic transactions were sometimes inclined to view direct state
intervention in the terms of employment as legislative favoritism. As a
result, even courts that routinely upheld all variety of economic
regulations could condemn as illegitimate "class legislation" reform
initiatives directed toward redressing inequality in bargaining power
between employers and employees.114
Justice Peckham's particular framing of the issue before the Court
warrants close attention. He wasted little time in announcing that a
man's "general" substantive due process right "to make a contract in
relation to his business" that the Court had endorsed in Allgeyer v.
Louisiana included "[t]he right to purchase and sell labor...."'s
Although the challenged hours regulation "necessarily interfere[d]" with
that right, that was not the end of the matter. There existed "certain
powers ... somewhat vaguely termed police powers," Peckham
explained, that inhered "in the sovereignty of each state," and with
which the "Fourteenth Amendment was not designed to interfere."" 6
"Both [the] property and liberty" protected by that Amendment were
thus "held on such reasonable conditions as may be imposed by
the . . . state in the exercise of those powers."'l7 Foremost among those

conditions was the requirement that police regulations serve "the safety,
health, morals, and general welfare of the public,"" 8 rather than the
partial interests of a particular class.
The Fourteenth Amendment right to liberty and property delimited
state authority not by establishing a bastion of individual economic
114. See generally Lindsay, supra note 96.
115. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905). As Part III.A makes clear, the Lochner
majority did not invent a constitutional right to individual economic liberty out of whole cloth. Recall
that Justices Field and Bradley had identified a right to pursue one's trade or calling several decades
earlier in the Slaughter-HouseCases and Butchers' Union. Inspired by those opinions, in the 1880s and
1890s a number of state courts had likewise divined such a right from the due process provisions of their
state constitutions. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. And then the Allgeyer Court indicated
in dicta that the "liberty" and "property" protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment encompassed the right to form contracts in relation to one's business. It was thus a
relatively short, if highly consequential, conceptual step for the Lochner majority to conclude that the
economic liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment included the purchase and sale of labor.
116. Id
117. Id. (emphasis added).
118. Id. (emphasis added).
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prerogative that the legislature could not breach, but rather by enabling
the federal courts, for the first time, to enforce conditions on the exercise
of state regulatory authority that were intrinsic to the police power itself.
"It must, of course, be conceded that there is a limit to the valid exercise
of the police power by the State," Justice Peckham explained.
"Otherwise the [Fourteenth] Amendment would have no efficacy and
the legislatures of the states would have unbounded power, and it would
be enough to say that any piece of legislation was enacted to conserve
the morals, the health or the safety of the people . . . 1.9 Were courts to

defer to every legislative assertion of public purpose, "no matter how
absolutely without foundation," "[t]he claim of the police power would
be a mere pretext-[and] become [a] delusive name for the supreme
sovereignty of the state to be exercised free from constitutional
constraint."1 20 The Fourteenth Amendment had made it the business of
the federal courts to scrutinize the police rationale proffered by a state
legislature, and thereby to ensure that the claims of public purpose were
more than "mere pretext." "In every case that comes before this
court ... where legislation of this character is concerned, and where the
protection of the Federal Constitution is sought," Justice Peckham
continued, "the question necessarily arises: Is this a fair, reasonable, and
appropriate exercise of the police power of the state, or is it an
unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary interference with the right of
the individual to his personal liberty . ..

?"121

This formulation of the basic question is telling. The hours law was
either a legitimate exercise of the police power or an unconstitutional
deprivation of personal liberty. Justice Peckham's framing left no room
for the possibility that it might serve a legitimate end of the police
power but nevertheless unconstitutionally deprive employers and
employees of their economic liberty without due process of law. The
natural, intrinsic scope of the police power, on the one hand, and the
unconstitutional interference with individual economic liberty, on the
other, were mutually exclusive. This makes sense once we understand
that Joseph Lochner's substantive due process right was operating not as
a constitutional trump, but rather as a trigger for heightened judicial
scrutiny, through which the Court enforced conditions on the exercise of
legislative authority that were intrinsic to the police power itself.
"[B]efore an act can be held to be valid which interferes with the general
right of an individual to be free in his person and in his power to
contract in relation to his own labor," Justice Peckham explained, the
regulation "must have a more direct relation, as a means to an end, and
119. Id. at 56.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate."' 22 The economic
compulsion inherent in the statute raised the constitutional stakes,
thereby triggering a more exacting review of the legislative rationale.
Justice Peckham considered two possible legislative ends. The first,
whether the act was valid "as a labor law, pure and simple," could "be
dismissed in a few words." 23 Assuming that "bakers as a class
are ... equal in intelligence and capacity to men in other trades or
manual occupations, [and] that they are ... able to assert their rights and
care for themselves without the protecting arm of the State," he
reasoned, "the interest of the public is not in the slightest degree
affected" by a law "interfering with their independence of judgment and
of action."124 Viewed as a "labor law," the regulation was naked class
legislation. Justice Peckham then turned to the second proffered
legislative end-that the law protected "the health of the individual
engaged in the occupation of a baker." 25
Justice Peckham
acknowledged that, in light of the voluminous "statistics regarding all
trades and occupations" that had been introduced into evidence, "the
trade of a baker does not appear to be as healthy as some other
trades . . . ."126 In the pre-Lochner era marked by judicial deference
toward a state's regulatory rationale, such a finding would have supplied
ample factual basis to uphold the law as a valid health regulation.
Indeed, earlier in his opinion Justice Peckham noted that judicial
scrutiny of state police regulations traditionally had "been guided by
rules of a very liberal nature ... .. "l27 But because the challenged hours
regulation implicated "the right of free contract on the part of the
individual," the Court required greater congruence between legislative
ends and means. As Justice Peckham explained, "[t]here must be more
than the mere fact of the possible existence of some small amount of
unhealthiness to warrant legislative interference with liberty." 28
Because baking was not distinctly more dangerous than many other
commonplace trades, Peckham concluded, it was not "unhealthy .. . to
that degree which would authorize the legislature to interfere with the
right to labor . . . ."129 By scrutinizing the means and ends of legislation
that seriously interfered with individual economic liberty, reviewing
122. Id. at 57-58.
123. Id. at 57.
124. Id.
125. Id. The hours regulation "does not affect any other portion of the public than those who are
engaged in that occupation," Peckham explained, for "[c]lean and wholesome bread does not depend
upon whether the baker works but ten hours per day or sixty hours a week." Id.
126. Id. at 59.
127. Id. at 54.
128. Id. at 59.
129. Id.
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courts could enforce the condition that police regulations serve the
health or welfare of the public, and thus guard against the kind of
governmental favoritism that, in the majority's view, characterized the
New York statute.
To read Lochner simply as an injunction against class legislation,
however, does not capture the full range of the majority's concerns.
Heightened judicial scrutiny also served as a bulwark against the
ominous expansion of the state police power generally. Peckham noted
the recent increase in legislative "interference . .. with the ordinary

trades and occupations of the people," and approvingly cited a series of
state court decisions striking down such regulations as unconstitutional
deprivations of individual liberty and property.130 If the State of New
York could abridge "the right of an individual, suijuris," to contract for
the sale of his labor, "there would seem to be no length to which
legislation of this nature might not go."l 3 1 "No trade, no occupation, no
mode of earning one's living, could escape this all-pervading power,', 32
he cautioned. As a result, the state "would assume the position of a
supervisor, or paterfamilias, over every act of the individual, and its
right of governmental interference with his hours of labor, his hours of
exercise, the character thereof, and the extent to which it shall be carried
would be recognized and upheld." 33 At stake for the majority was not
only the principle of governmental neutrality, or even freedom of
contract, but the sovereignty of the individual in his relation to the
authority of the state.134
130. Id. at 63.
131. Id. at 58.
132. Id. at 59. "A printer, a tinsmith, a locksmith, a carpenter, a cabinetmaker, a dry goods clerk,
a bank's, a lawyer's, or a physician's clerk, or a clerk in almost any kind of business, would all come
under the power of the legislature," Peckham continued. Id. If the Court were to endorse "the interest
of the state that its population should be strong and robust," and thereby sanction as a valid health law
"any legislation which may be said to tend to make people healthy," all manner of human conduct
"would come under the restrictive sway of the legislature." Id. at 60. By way of illustration, Peckham
described a parade of horribles running more than a page in length. Under the government's theory, he
declared, "[niot only the hours of employees, but the powers of employers, could be regulated, and
doctors, lawyers, scientists, all professional men, as well as athletes and artisans, could be forbidden to
fatigue their brains and bodies by prolonged hours of exercise, lest the fighting strength of the state be
impaired." Id. at 60-61. "We mention these extreme cases," Peckham explained, "because the
contention is extreme." Id. at 61.
133. Id. at 62.
134. Professor Bernstein, in particular, argues that some Lochner revisionists have overstated the
importance of the "state neutrality" principle, which, he maintains, was "barely evident in Peckham's
majority opinion." BERNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 33. Bernstein thus reads Lochner as emphasizing
"individual liberty rights rather than hostility to class legislation ..... Id. at 33-34. In my view, the
dual themes of individual liberty and state neutrality are best understood not as alternative principles or
judicial values, but rather as interdependent elements in the Court's enforcement of limits on state
authority that are indigenous to the police power itself. That said, I agree with Bernstein that by the
early 1920s, the "anticlass legislation" theme had receded and the right to economic liberty had become
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At bottom, the Lochner Court struck down New York's maximum
hours law because, in an era when individual economic prerogatives
were increasingly constrained by the state in new and significant ways,
five Justices were not persuaded that limiting the number of hours
worked by bakers meaningfully served the general welfare or public
health.13 5 Because the statute transgressed the constitutive terms of the
police power, the legislature had exceeded its authority.' 3 6 Limiting
state regulatory authority to matters of the public health and general
welfare was not new in principle; in practice, however, those limits had
rarely been tested.
Just as the substantive due process right to economic liberty in
Lochner operated in dialogue with the constitutive terms of the state
police power, so, too, did it shape, and was shaped by, Congress'
constitutionally enumerated power to regulate interstate commerce. In
Adair v. United States,'3 7 decided just three years after Lochner, the
Court struck down on substantive due process grounds the federal
dominant. See id. at 48-50.
135. The constitutional logic of Justice Peckham's majority opinion is famously resistant to
simple characterization, and for that reason has furnished generations of historians and legal scholars
with a fertile subject of interpretation and debate. The difficulty of pointing to Lochner's singular, real
meaning is due, at least in part, to the fact that the decision occupies a critical place in the Court's highly
contested, decades-long transition between two historical modes of protecting individual liberty. For
most of the nineteenth century, Professor Gillman writes, the Court's individual liberties jurisprudence
"view[ed] rights as specific immunities from government power," in which judges protected liberty
"residually by limiting legislative power to a set of acceptable objects and purposes. . . ." Gillman,
supra note 100, at 639. During the first several decades of the twentieth century, in response to an
increasingly plenary governmental authority with few meaningful, intrinsic limits, the Court gradually
relinquished the traditional "limited powers-residual freedoms" model in favor of a jurisprudence that
"extend[ed] special protections to particularly important rights and liberties"-what Gillman calls our
modem "general powers-preferred freedoms" model. Id. at 640, 643. Peckham's opinion bears the
distinct stamp of both of these regimes.
136. Indeed, in several other Lochner-era police powers cases, the Court upheld economic
regulations that interfered directly with the contractual freedom of employers and employees, on the
ground that they bore a sufficiently direct relationship to a legitimate end of the police power. See, e.g.,
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) (upholding a Utah law limiting the hours of labor for miners and
smelters); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding an Oregon law limiting the hours of labor
for women to ten hours per day); Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917) (upholding an Oregon law
limiting the hours of labor for women and men to ten hours per day, and requiring employers to pay
time-and-a-half wages for up to three overtime hours per day).
Justice Harlan's dissent in Lochner, which was joined by Justices White and Day, reinforces
this reading. In contrast to Justice Holmes' more famous charge of ideological motivated judicial
activism, Justice Harlan's criticism of the majority opinion centered on the demanding means/ends
scrutiny to which it had subjected the challenged regulation. "[U]nless the regulations are so utterly
unreasonable and extravagant in their nature and purpose that the property and personal rights of the
citizen are unnecessarily, and in a manner wholly arbitrary, interfered with or destroyed without due
process of law," he maintained, "they do not extend beyond the power of the state to pass . . . ."
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 67 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Notwithstanding the fundamental rights of liberty and
property, the "burden of proof" remained at all times "upon those who assert [the regulation] to be
unconstitutional." Id. at 68.
137. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
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Erdman Act of 1898, making it a criminal offense to refuse to hire or to
discharge a worker because of membership in a labor union. To forbid
an employer from hiring and firing whomever he pleased, the majority
explained, was "an invasion of the personal liberty, as well as of the
right of property," guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.' 38
On the one hand, this conclusion is fairly
unremarkable-after all, because the due process clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments are identical, one would expect that a
substantive due process right to economic liberty would apply
symmetrically to federal and state legislation.1 39 And in fact, in this
respect Adair amounts to a straightforward application of the rule of
Lochner, in which the commerce power serves as the federal analogue to
the state police power.
The basic structure of Justice Harlan's majority opinion is particularly
telling. After describing the statute, Justice Harlan announced that the
"first inquiry" was whether the challenged provisions deprived the
parties to an employment contract of their liberty or property without
due process of law. The majority had little difficulty concluding that it
did. Justice Harlan affirmed that "[t]he right to purchase or to sell labor
is part of the liberty protected by"140 the due process clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. Therefore, legislation that interfered with
an employer and employee's "equality of right" in fixing the terms of
employment was "an arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract
which no government can legally justify in a free land."14 1 Because "an
employer is under [no] legal obligation, against his will, to retain an
employee in his personal service," Adair had the "legal right . .. to

discharge [an employee] because of his being a member of a labor
organization .... 14 2 In theory, that conclusion should have ended the
Court's analysis of the challenged provision. After all, if the Erdman
Act unconstitutionally deprived employers of their contractual liberty
without due process of law, it would be unnecessary to consider whether
the Commerce Clause might have otherwise empowered Congress to
adopt the statute. If the substantive due process right to economic
138. Id. at 172.
139. Cf Williams, supra note 84, at 428-99 (demonstrating that, by the time the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified in 1868, the phrase "due process of law" had acquired a host of substantive
connotations that it lacked eight decades earlier, when the Fifth Amendment was ratified).
140. Adair, 208 U.S. at 173.
141. Id. at 174. "While ... the right of liberty and property ... [were] subject to such reasonable
restraints as the common good or the general welfare may require," Harlan explained, "it is not within
the functions of government ... to compel any person, in the course of his business and against his will,
to accept or retain the personal services of another, or to compel any person, against his will, to perform
personal services for another." Id.
142. Id at 175.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

35

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 1

722

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 82

liberty operates as it is conventionally understood (and as Chief Justice
Roberts characterized it during oral argument in NFIB v. Sebelius)-as
an affirmative, extrinsic constraint on Congress-it should trump
whatever authority Congress might have by virtue of its commerce
power to regulate the terms of employment.
Yet even in the face of the Fifth Amendment violation, Justice Harlan
proceeded to consider at length whether the Act might nevertheless
qualify as a valid regulation of interstate commerce. Congress'
impairment of Adair's Fifth Amendment substantive due process right,
like New York's impairment of Joseph Lochner's Fourteenth
Amendment right, triggered heightened judicial scrutiny of the proffered
legislative rationale. As in Lochner, the inquiry in Adair centered on the
relationship between the challenged regulation and the constitutive
terms of the governmental authority at issue-here, whether prohibiting
employers from discriminating against members of labor unions
qualified as a regulation of commerce among the several states.
According to the majority, the connection between the legislative means
selected by Congress and the constitutionally sanctioned ends of the
"[B]ettering the conditions and
commerce power was lacking.
conserving the interests of... wage-earners," Harlan declared, had
"nothing to do with interstate commerce, as such."1 43 Although
Congress had "a large discretion" in its "choice of the means . .. in the

regulation of interstate commerce," the majority could discern no
"possible legal or logical connection . .. between an employee's

membership in a labor organization and the carrying on of interstate
commerce[.]" 144
Justice Harlan's summation of the Court's holding underscores the
doctrinal interchange between the constitutional right at issue and the
construction of "interstate commerce." The statute "must be held to be
repugnant to the [Fifth] Amendment," he concluded, "and as not
embraced nor within the power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce, but, under the guise of regulating interstate commerce. . . it
arbitrarily sanctions an illegal invasion of personal liberty as well as the
right of property . . .. 145 Notably, Harlan does not say that, although
regulating the labor relations of employers and workers engaged in
interstate commerce might otherwise fall within Congress' purview, the
statute is nevertheless invalid because it unconstitutionally interferes
with economic liberty. Rather, the statute exceeded the scope of
Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause because it deprived
employers of economic liberty in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
143. Id. at 178.
144. Id at 177-78.
145. Id. at 180.
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The constitutional meaning of "interstate commerce"-specifically, the
narrowness of its scope-is inseparable from the conclusion that
Congress had invaded employers' constitutional right to economic
liberty. Reading the right to economic liberty not as a constitutional
trump, but rather as a trigger for heightened means/ends scrutiny,
illuminates that, just as the Court's defense of constitutional economic
liberty was essential to the meaning of "general welfare" or "public
health" in Lochner, so, too, did it shape the intrinsic scope of the
commerce power in Adair. Professor Barry Cushman has similarly
suggested that the conception of federal authority that Justice Harlan
posited in Adair amounted to a kind of federal "commercial police
power," under which Congress might, if circumstances warranted, be
empowered to interfere with Fifth Amendment economic rights in order
to "protect the free flow of interstate commerce." 146 The effect,
Cushman concludes, was to define such rights "in terms of the impact
that employer-employee relations exerted on interstate commerce." 4
Whether one emphasizes that Adair's Fifth Amendment right to
economic liberty informed the majority's construction of "interstate
commerce" (as I have), or that the majority's construction of "interstate
commerce" defined the "sphere of liberty [of contract] protected by the
Fifth Amendment" (as Cushman does), 48 the essential point is that both
Adair's right and Congress' authority took shape in relation to the other;
and that this mutually constitutive quality defies the conventional
dichotomy between external, rights-based constraints on legislative
authority, on the one hand, and internal, textual and structural
constraints, on the other. Indeed, throughout the decades preceding the
New Deal, Fifth Amendment substantive due process rights, even if not
always fully articulated, came to operate as structural features in the
Court's federalism jurisprudence. 14 Adair thus illustrates how the
146. CUSHMAN, supra note 27, at 111.
147. Id. at 112.
148. Id.
149. In Hammer v. Dagenhart, for example, the Court struck down, ostensibly on federalism
grounds, a provision of the federal Child Labor Act of 1916 prohibiting the interstate shipment of goods
produced by enterprises that employed child labor. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
According to the Court, the Act was "in a two-fold sense ... repugnant to the Constitution. It not only
transcend[ed] the authority delegated to Congress over commerce but also exert[ed] a power as to a
purely local matter to which the federal authority does not extend." Id. at 276. Notwithstanding this
federalist framing of the issue, Cushman explains, "the restriction on congressional power... was
derived neither from the internal limitations on the Commerce Clause, nor from whatever affirmative
limitations the Tenth Amendment might impose, but instead from the limitations of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment." Barry Cushman, Carolene Products and Constitutional Structure,
2012 SUP. CT. REV. 321 (2012). Cf Logan E. Sawyer III, CreatingHammer v. Dagenhart, 21 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 67 (2012) (arguing that, at the time Hammer was decided, the doctrinal lynchpin of
the majority opinion-the "harmless items limit" to Congress' Commerce Clause authority-was a
principled and widely recognized constraint on the federal commerce power).
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customary division of constitutional law into "structure" and "rights"-a
division that is essential to Chief Justice Roberts and the joint
dissenters' Commerce Clause opinions in NFIB v. Sebelius-obscures
what Cushman aptly characterizes as the "deep and important
relationships that often have obtained between these two [doctrinal]
domains. . . ."15o
The substantive due process right to "liberty of contract" reached its
apex in the 1923 case of Adkins v. Children's Hospital.'5 ' In Adkins, a
five-Justice majority struck down a federal statute establishing a
minimum wage for women in Washington, D.C. as an unconstitutional
deprivation of liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Justice Sutherland's majority opinion applied the basic
analytical framework adopted in Lochner, first affirming the
constitutional economic right at issue and then subjecting the legislative
rationale to heightened scrutiny.
Justice Sutherland's principal
challenge was to distinguish the case from Muller v. Oregon, in which
the Court had upheld a maximum hours law for women just fifteen years
earlier. In Muller, the Justices had unanimously accepted the state's
argument that, due to "difference[s] between the sexes," limiting
women's hours of labor served the public health in ways that limiting
men's hours of labor did not.152 Under the exacting scrutiny of the
Adkins majority, however, interfering with private labor contracts in
order to redress inequalities in bargaining power between women
workers and their employers no longer bore a sufficient relationship to
the public health. In light of the political and legal strides that women
had made over the prior generation, Sutherland reasoned, the Court
could no longer "accept the doctrine that women of mature age, sui juris,
require or may be subjected to restrictions upon their liberty of contract
which could not be imposed in the case of men under similar
circumstances."l 5 3 With that, the Adkins Court disposed of the public
150. Cushman, supra note 149, at 376.
151. Adkins v. Children's Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
152. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419 (1908). "That woman's physical structure and the
performance of maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is
obvious," the Court had observed, "and, as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the
physical well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve the
strength and vigor of the race." Id. at 421.
153. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 553. "In view of the great-not to say revolutionary-changes which
have taken place since [Muller], in the contractual, political, and civil status of women, culminating in
the Nineteenth Amendment," the Court reasoned, sex differences "have now come almost ... to the
vanishing point." Id. It is tempting to read Justice Sutherland's invocation of the Nineteenth
Amendment as a cynical, or at least opportunistic, deployment of women's equality discourse in the
service of his real purpose of constraining the ability of governments to interfere in employment
relationships; and perhaps it was. But bonafide women's rights activists, including Alice Paul of the
national Women's Party and other prominent advocates of an Equal Rights Amendment, actively
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health rationale that had carried the day less than a generation before.
In Adkins, the constitutional right to "liberty of contract" thus ripened
into a more pointed injunction against interfering with individual
economic prerogatives in the private labor market. The majority
opinion omits Lochner's broad reflection on the scope of the state police
power; instead, the constitutional right itself takes center stage, and does
most of the analytical work. "[F]reedom of contract is. .. the general
rule," Justice Sutherland explained, "and restraint the exception, and the
exercise of legislative authority to abridge it can be justified only by the
existence of exceptional circumstances."l 54 In forming labor contracts,
"the parties have an equal right to obtain from each other the best terms
they can as the result of private bargaining."155 The Court's virtual
presumption of unconstitutionality was triggered by the law's denial to
both employers and employees of the full freedom to engage in that
bargaining process. The law was "simply and exclusively a price-fixing
law," Justice Sutherland declared, because it prevented individuals from
"freely contract[ing] with one another in respect to the price for which
one shall render service to the other in a purely private employment
where both are willing, perhaps anxious, to agree. ... 156 When the
government fixes a wage according the minimum needs of the employee
rather than the value of the services provided, "it amounts to a
compulsory exaction from the employer" of an "arbitrary
payment. . . having no causal connection with his business, or ... the
work the employee engages to do."157 This compelled disbursement,
divorced from a market-driven notion of value, rendered the statute "a
naked, arbitrary exercise of power,"' 58 and thus "put[] upon it the stamp
of invalidity. ..."159 The forceful anti-compulsion language of Adkins,
supported the Children's Hospital and individual employees challenging the minimum wage law.
Moreover, Sutherland himself had long been a vocal supporter of women's rights, and as a Republican
Senator from Utah had even introduced the Nineteenth Amendment in the U.S. Senate. See BERNSTEIN,
supranote 12, at 66-69.
154. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 546.
155. Id. at 545.
156. Id. at 554-55.
157. Id. at 557-58. "The price fixed by the board need have no relation to the capacity or earning
power of the employee . . . ." Id. at 555. It applies "without regard to [the] nature or the character of the
work." Id.
158. Id. at 559.
159. Id. at 558. Twelve years later, in Moreheadv. New York, the Court relied entirely on Adkins
to strike down a New York law prohibiting the payment of "oppressive and unreasonable wage[s]."
Morehead v. New York, 298 U.S. 587, 619-22 (1936). The Act's fatal flaw, according to the Court,
was the legislature's definition of "oppressive and unreasonable" to include wages that were "less than
sufficient to meet the minimum cost of living necessary to health." Id. at 605 (internal quotation marks
omitted). As in Adkins, to fix a wage through any means but private bargaining rendered the wage an
"arbitrary" "exaction," and as such an instance of economic compulsion in conflict with constitutional
economic liberty.
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and the virtual presumption of unconstitutionality that accompanied it,
has perhaps clouded both the principle of legislative impartiality that
animated Lochner and the extent to which the Lochner Court understood
itself to be enforcing limits on legislative authority that were intrinsic to
the police power itself.
C. Economic Regulation and the Presumptionof Constitutionality
in the Post-New DealEra
In light of the "doctrinal cross-pollination"160 between the Supreme
Court's Fifth Amendment and Commerce Clause jurisprudence, it was
no coincidence that the Court abandoned both substantive due process
and federalism-oriented constraints on the commerce power in tandem.
The conventional scholarly account of the New Deal "revolution" in
constitutional law has centered on the Court's apparent "switch in time"
in the spring of 1937, when its two "moderates"--Chief Justice Charles
Evans Hughes and Justice Owen Roberts-joined its three stalwart
"liberals" to remove the most troublesome constitutional impediments to
legislative regulation of the economy. First, in West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish,the Court upheld a Washington State minimum wage law for
women, rejecting the Adkins Court's notion of "an absolute and
uncontrollable liberty"' 6 ' protected by the Due Process Clause. "Liberty
under the Constitution is ... necessarily subject to the restraints of due
process," the Court explained, and "regulation which is reasonable in
relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is
due process."l 62 Two weeks later, in United States v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel, the Court upheld under the commerce power provisions of the
160. CUSHMAN, supranote 27, at 140.
161. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937). The Court continued:
In each case the violation alleged by those attacking minimum wage regulation for women is
deprivation of freedom of contract. What is this freedom? The Constitution does not speak of
freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due
process of law.... [T]he liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social organization which requires
the protection of law against the evils which menace the health, safety, morals, and welfare of
the people.
Id.
162. Id. In fact, the Court had disavowed the "absolute and uncontrollable liberty" of Adkins
three years earlier, in Nebbia v. New York, when it a rejected a substantive due process challenge to a
New York State statute fixing the price of milk. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). The Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court explained, "do not prohibit
governmental regulation for the public welfare," but merely require "that the end shall be accomplished
by methods consistent with due process." Id. at 510. "And the guaranty of due process ... demands
only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that the means selected shall
have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained." Id. at 510-11. On the
importance of Nebbia in the New Deal constitutional revolution, see infra notes 165-167 and
accompanying text.
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National Labor Relations Act guaranteeing the right of workers to form
labor unions and obliging employers to engage in collective bargaining
In so doing, the Court relaxed the
with union representatives.
categorical distinction between interstate commerce and formerly
"intrastate" activities such as "manufacturing" and "production," thus
dramatically loosening the constitutional strictures on Congress'
exercise of its commerce power.163 Because commercial disruption
borne of industrial conflict "presents in the most striking way the very
close and intimate relation which a manufacturing industry may have to
interstate commerce," the majority reasoned, there could be "no doubt
that Congress had constitutional authority to safeguard the right
of.. . employees to self-organization and freedom in the choice of
representatives for collective bargaining."' 6
More recently, revisionist scholars have challenged this narrative.
Professor Cushman argues persuasively that the watershed moment in
the New Deal constitutional revolution came not in 1937, but three years
earlier, in Nebbia v. New York,' 6 5 when the Court abandoned the longstanding distinction between businesses "affected with a public
interest," over which the states and Congress traditionally enjoyed broad
regulatory authority under their police and commerce powers,
respectively, and "private" businesses, which were buffered against
governmental intervention. By the time the Court decided Parrish,
Cushman argues, it had already discarded an essential premise of
economic substantive due process-the notion that only a discrete class
of public and quasi-public enterprises were susceptible to wage and
price regulations. Although Nebbia involved the state police power,
"[t]he breakdown of the public/private distinction... held dramatic
potential consequences for commerce clause doctrine," as well. 6 6
Under this reading, Jones & Laughlin Steel merely made manifest a
doctrinal shift set in motion years earlier.' 67
Whatever the precise nature and timing of the doctrinal revolution,
163. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
164. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 43 (1937).
165. Nebbia, 291 U.S. 502 (upholding a New York state law regulating the price of milk).
166. CUSHMAN, supra note 27, at 155. Under the prevailing doctrinal framework, Cushman
explains, the commerce power could not reach an intrastate business unless the enterprise was both
"affected with a public interest" and "located within a current of interstate commerce . . . ." Id. at 146.
As long as the class of businesses affected with a public interest was small, "the channel cut by the
current of commerce promised to remain narrow." Id. at 155. By throwing open that class, Nebbia left
unchecked the inherent volatility of the current of commerce doctrine-namely, its "capacity to
transform the local into the national." Id. at 152.
167. Nebbia's transformative potential for Commerce Clause doctrine remained suppressed in
Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), and Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238 (1936), Cushman
explains, because the plaintiffs in those cases persuaded a majority of the Court that the regulated
activities lay outside the stream of interstate commerce. Id. at 165.
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however, the important point is that the New Deal Court replaced both
substantive due process and, in the Commerce Clause cases, the
manufacturing/commerce and direct/indirect effects distinctions, with a
unified framework for reviewing state and federal economic regulations
that was premised on a strong presumption of constitutionality. "[A]ll
we have to decide," the Parrish Court declared, was that a statutory
minimum wage was not an "arbitrary or capricious" means of protecting
women from "[the] most injurious competition" in the labor market.16
"[R]egulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions"
would be upheld, the Court explained four weeks later, unless the
available facts "preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational
basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators."l 69
With respect to federal commercial regulations, as well, the Court
showed great deference toward the legislative judgments of Congress.
In Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court had accepted Congress' appraisal,
supported by abundant findings of fact, that preventing industrial strife
between employees and employers had a "close and intimate relation" to
the legislative end of preserving the free flow of interstate commerce.
In UnitedStates v. Darby and Wickard v. Filburn,that relative deference
ripened into the virtual withdrawal of the judiciary from any meaningful
role in supervising Congress' asserted Commerce Clause rationale. The
"only function of the courts" was "to determine whether the particular
activity regulated or prohibited is within the reach of the federal
power,"' 7 0 a unanimous Darby Court declared. If it was, Congress
could "choose the means reasonably adapted to the attainment of the
permitted end ... .."
In short, the Court would no longer police the
168. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937). "[I]f the protection of women is a
legitimate end of the exercise of state power," the Court queried, "how can it be said that the
requirement of the payment of a minimum wage fairly fixed in order to meet the very necessities of
existence is not an admissible means to that end?" Id. at 398.
169. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). "[Bly their very nature," the
Court concluded, "such inquiries, where the legislative judgment is drawn in question, must be restricted
to the issue whether any state of facts either known or which could reasonably be assumed affords
support for it." Id. at 154. Any lingering doubts that reviewing courts faced with substantive due
process challenges to economic regulations would defer to the judgment of the legislature were erased in
Williamson v. Lee Optical. There, the Court made clear that the presumption of constitutionally was
virtually irrebuttable, and that it would search the speculative universe of possible legislative rationales
to uphold even a "needless, wasteful requirement. .. ." Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348
U.S. 483, 487 (1955). The Court continued: "The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial
conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of
thought." Id. at 488.
170. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 120-21 (1941).
171. Id. at 121. The commerce power extended even "to those activities intrastate which so affect
interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them
appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce." Id. at 118. Moreover, the "motive and purpose of a regulation of
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constitutional sufficiency of the relationship between the specific object
of regulation and the end of regulating interstate commerce. The
Wickard Court went still further, announcing that "effective restraints on
[the commerce power] must proceed from political rather than judicial
processes," 72 and accepting on faith Congress' assertion that wheat
consumed on the farm where it was grown could, considered in
aggregate, have a substantial effect on the interstate wheat market. As
Justice Jackson, the author of the Wickard opinion, acknowledged in
private correspondence, "' [w]e have all but reached an era in the
interpretation of the commerce clause of candid recognition that we
have no legal judgment upon economic effects which we can oppose to
the policy judgment made by Congress in legislation . . . .'"7
The presumption of constitutionality for economic regulations was
subject to an important qualification, however, identified in the famous
footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products.174 "There may be
narrower scope for operation of the presumption," the Court explained,
"when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition
of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments ....
Three decades later, in Griswold v. Connecticut,176 the Court extended
the application of heightened scrutiny to legislation that interfered with
some nonenumerated rights, as well. As a result, the "liberty" protected
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment now
extends to "those personal rights that are fundamental, and is not
confined to the specific terms of the Bill of Rights." 7 7 Since its
decision in Parrish, however, the Court has steadfastly rejected
invitations to include economic liberty on the list of nonenumerated
interstate commerce are matters for the legislative judgment upon the exercise of which the Constitution
places no restriction and over which the courts are given no control." Id. at 115. "Whatever the[ir]
motive and purpose, regulations of commerce which do not infringe some constitutional prohibition are
within the plenary power conferred on Congress by the Commerce Clause." Id.
172. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942).
173. Barry Cushman, Formalismand Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence,67 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1089, 1143 (2000) (quoting Memorandum for Mr. Costelloe, Re Wickard Case 15 (July 12, 1942)).
Jackson continued: "'It is perhaps time that we recognize that the introduction of economic determinism
into constitutional law of interstate commerce marked the end of judicial control of the scope of federal
activity. "' Id.

174. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144.
175. Id. at 152 n.4. Of course, footnote four also famously identified two additional
circumstances that may warrant "more searching judicial inquiry": "legislation which restricts those
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation;"
and legislation motivated by "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities . .. which tends seriously
to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities. . . ." Id.
176. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (identifying a fundamental right to marital
privacy).
177. Id at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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fundamental rights.17 8

During the Lochner era, the Court selectively applied heightened
means/ends scrutiny to state police and federal commercial regulations
that were found to interfere with individual economic liberty. Since the
New Deal, however, when the Court abandoned the notion of
fundamental economic rights, both state and federal economic
legislation have been afforded the same strong presumption of
constitutionality. So long as the means employed are rationally related
to a permissible legislative end, courts will uphold the regulation. As
Part IV explains, this congruence between the Court's approach to state
police and federal commercial legislation confounds the distinction
drawn by Chief Justice Roberts and the joint dissenters between a
federal commerce authority that flows from and is limited by the terms
of Article I, and a "plenary" state police power constrained only by the
"affirmative" prohibitions of the Bill of Rights or other "fundamental"
liberty interest.
IV. EcoNOMIC LIBERTY AND FEDERALISM INNFIB v. SEBELIUS
Faced with a federal statute that was unambiguously economic in

nature, a market that was undeniably interstate, and a Court that was
unlikely to revisit the "substantial effects" or "aggregation" doctrines, 179
the ACA plaintiffs were challenged with formulating a limiting principle
that would nevertheless exclude the MCP from the scope of
congressional authority. Their solution, which Chief Justice Roberts
and the four joint dissenters endorsed, was to distinguish between
"activity," which can be subject to the federal commerce power, and
"inactivity," which cannot. As the Chief Justice explained, Congress'
constitutionally enumerated authority to "regulate commerce"
necessarily "presupposes the existence of commercial activity to be
regulated;" 80 this "natural understanding" of the constitutional text,
moreover, had been further confirmed by two centuries of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence that "uniformly describe[s] the power as reaching
178. See supra note 70.
179. Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that while "[tihe path of our Commerce Clause
decisions has not always run smooth. . . it is now well established that Congress has broad authority" to
regulate not only "activities that 'have a substantial effect on interstate commerce,"' but also "activities
that do so only when aggregated with similar activities of others." Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585-86 (2012) (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118-19
(1941); Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942)).
180. Id. at 2586.
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This was a limiting principle, the Justices insisted,
'activity."'8
deduced from the text and history of the Commerce Clause and the
structural constitutional value of federalism.
This Part analyzes that limiting principle in light of the Supreme
Court's Lochner-era substantive due process decisions. As Part III
argued, the constitutional right to individual economic liberty operated
in those opinions not as a trump against governmental interference with
private economic prerogatives, but as a convenient warrant for the
Court's selectively aggressive scrutiny of federal and state economic
regulation. In assessing the adequacy of the "fit" between the regulatory
end (in Lochner and Adkins, the "general welfare" or "public health"; in
Adair, the regulation of interstate commerce) and the regulatory means
adopted (establishing maximum hours or minimum wages, or
prohibiting employment discrimination against union members) the
Court was reinterpreting the intrinsic, constitutive terms of the state
police and federal commerce powers. The Lochner-era substantive due
process cases thus illustrate how the Court can adapt the intrinsic scope
of both state and federal legislative authority in order to vindicate the
value of economic liberty.
This Part proceeds in three Subparts. Subpart A describes Chief
Justice Roberts and the joint dissenters' contention that the
activity/inactivity distinction is a strictly intrinsic constraint on
congressional authority rooted in the text and history of the Commerce
Clause. Subpart B argues that, notwithstanding the Justices' insistence
that economic rights played no part in their reasoning, their threshold
finding that the MCP improperly interferes with individual economic
liberty operates much as the substantive due process right to freedom of
contract did during the Lochner era, as a trigger for heightened
means/ends scrutiny. Finally, Subpart C considers Chief Justice
Roberts' conclusion that Congress lacked authority under the Necessary
and Proper Clause to enact the MCP. It argues that, in reading the term
"proper" to impose federalism-derived limits on the scope of the
commerce power, the Chief Justice recasts congressional interference
with individual liberty as a sin against the structural Constitution.
A. The Activity/Inactivity Distinctionas a StructuralConstrainton
CongressionalAuthority

The logic of Chief Justice Roberts' Commerce Clause opinion is
relatively straightforward. It consists of the major premise that the
commerce power extends only to existing commercial activity; the
181. Id. at 2587.
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minor premise that the MCP does not regulate existing commercial
activity; and the conclusion that Congress lacked authority under the

Commerce Clause to enact the MCP. The Chief Justice began his
opinion with a familiar civics lesson on the nature and limits of federal
authority.
"In our federal system," he explained, "the National
Government possesses only limited powers .... "182
"[R]ather than
granting general authority to perform all the conceivable functions of
government, the Constitution lists, or enumerates, the Federal
Government's powers."' 83 That constitutional enumeration, in turn, "is
also a limitation of powers, because '[t]he enumeration presupposes
something not enumerated.""18 4 Perhaps seeking to buffer the majority

against charges of "Lochnerism," 85 the Chief Justice was at pains to
distinguish between the federalism-oriented limits on congressional
authority that are inherent in enumerated powers, and "the restrictions
on government power foremost in many Americans' minds"-namely,

"affirmative prohibitions, such as contained in the Bill of Rights."'

86

"These affirmative prohibitions come into play ... only where the
Government possesses authority to act in the first place," he explained,
but when "no enumerated power authorizes Congress to pass a certain
law, that law may not be enacted, even if it would not violate any of the

express prohibitions in the Bill of Rights or elsewhere in the
Constitution." 87
The joint dissenters likewise emphasized the
distinction between structural and rights-based limits on congressional
authority:
The constitutional protections that this case involves are protections of
structure. Structural protections-notably, the restraints imposed by
federalism and separation of powers-are less romantic and have less
obvious a connection to personal freedom than the provisions of the Bill
of Rights or the Civil War Amendments. Hence they tend to be
undervalued or even forgotten by our citizens. It should be the
responsibility of the Court to teach otherwise, to remind our people that
the Framers considered structural protections of freedom the most
important ones, for which reason they alone were embodied in the
original Constitution and not left to later amendment. The fragmentation
of power produced by the structure of our Government is central to
.188
liberty, and when we destroy it, we place liberty at peril.

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 2577.
Id.
Id. (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824)).
See notes 11-14, 16 and accompanying text.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2577.
Id.
Id. at 2676-77 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
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In light of the Court's general and repeated disavowal during the postLochner era of a substantive due process right to economic liberty," the
distinction was vital to the perceived legitimacy of what had become a
highly politicized decision.190 Lochner was about long-since-abandoned
constitutional economic rights; at stake in the challenge to the MCP was
the American system of dual sovereignty.
Chief Justice Roberts made a similar point to distinguish the
enumerated, and thereby limited, powers of the federal government from
the extra-constitutional, plenary authority of the states. State authority
was subject to the "affirmative prohibitions" embodied in federal
constitutional rights, he explained, "[b]ut where such prohibitions do not
apply, state governments do not need constitutional authorization to
act."1 91 Because states are unburdened by the constraints on legislative
authority that are a natural concomitant of constitutionally enumerated
powers, the states "can and do perform many of the vital functions of
modem government-punishing street crime, running schools, and
zoning property for development"-that are beyond Congress' reach. In
order to prevent federal encroachment into the regulatory domain of the
states, Roberts counseled, enumerated powers "must be read carefully to
avoid creating a general federal authority akin to the police power."' 92
Indeed, Roberts and the joint dissenters reiterated throughout their
opinions that the government's theory of congressional authority
threatened to convert the Commerce Clause into a federal police power.
Even as Chief Justice Roberts rendered the activity/inactivity
distinction in the language of federalism, however, his analysis was
directed less toward preserving dual sovereignty than protecting
individuals against federal compulsion. To permit Congress to regulate
individuals "precisely because they are doing nothing," Roberts worried,
"would open a new and potentially vast domain of congressional
authority."l 93 "Every day individuals do not do an infinite number of
things," and if the mere "effect of inaction on commerce" were a
sufficient constitutional warrant for the exercise of the commerce power,
"countless decisions an individual could potentially make" would be
drawn within the scope of federal authority, thus empowering Congress
to "make those decisions for him."' 94 "Congress already enjoys vast
189. See supra note 70.
190. See supra note 16.
191. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2578 (majority opinion).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 2587.
194. Id. This unchecked power to direct the decisions of individuals might even include forcing
people to "buy vegetables" or "eat a balanced diet" in order to reduce the medical, and thus financial,
"burden of obesity." Id. at 2588. The joint dissenters were more dire still in their prediction. To go
beyond the aggregation theory of Wickard, they declared, "is to make mere breathing in and out the
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power to regulate much of what we do," he cautioned, and "[a]ccepting
the Government's theory would give Congress the same license to
regulate what we do not do, fundamentally changing the relation
between the citizen and the Federal Governm ent." 95 The Commerce
Clause was not "a general license to regulate an individual from cradle
to grave . . . . 196 Notably, this ostensibly federalism-based exemption
of "inactivity" from federal commercial regulation neglects to identify
how the MCP threatens the sovereignty of the states or otherwise
implicates the constitutional distribution of authority between the states
and the federal government. Rather, to the extent that state sovereignty
makes any appearance in the Chief Justice's analysis, it is primarily as a
foil to the specifically constituted authority of Congress.' 97
B. Phantom Economic Rights and HeightenedScrutiny
After establishing that the commerce power extends only to regulable
"activity," the Chief Justice and the joint dissenters turned to their minor
premise: that the status of being uninsured did not qualify as such. In
response to the challengers' characterization of the MCP as an improper
regulation of "inactivity," the government had contended that the
"uninsured as a class"-the regulatory objects of the MCP-were in fact

basis for federal prescription and to extend federal power to virtually all human activity." Id. at 2643
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). "If all inactivity affecting commerce is
commerce, commerce is everything," and "everything is within federal control simply because it exists."
Id. at 2649. As Professors Rosen and Schmidt point out, the parade of horribles marched out by the
Commerce Clause majority served to shrink the "disconnect" between the "liberty-based critique of the
health insurance mandate" advanced by popular constitutional opponents of the ACA, and the doctrinal
terms in which the Court would ultimately resolve the Commerce Clause question-namely,
enumerated powers and federalism. The so-called "broccoli horrible," in particular, Rosen and Schmidt
demonstrate, had the effect of imposing upon the government the burden of articulating a limiting
principle under which Congress could require people to purchase health insurance but not broccoli. This
was an extraordinary strategic accomplishment, in light of the "nearly unbroken [] practice of the
Supreme Court," including the Roberts Court, to "abjure limiting principles and instead confine itself to
a narrow focus on determining whether the challenged statute . . . is constitutional." Rosen & Schmidt,
supranote 16 at 78.
195. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2589.
196. Id. at 2591. The joint dissenters were even more colorful in their denunciations of the
government's theory. "If Congress can reach out and command" participation in the health insurance
market, "the Commerce Clause becomes a font of unlimited power. . . 'the hideous monster whose
devouring jaws ... spare neither sex nor age, nor high nor low, nor sacred nor profane."' Id. at 2646
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 202
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
197. As I argued in Part III, it is misleading to suggest that because we understand the police
power as an extra-constitutional adjunct to state sovereignty, it does not contain its own intrinsic limits.
When the Lochner Court scrutinized and found lacking the fit between the challenged hours law and the
general welfare or public health, it was enforcing conditions on the exercise of state legislative authority
that were intrinsic to the police power itself. See supra Part M.
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"active in the market for health care." 98 Because the uninsured
"regularly seek and obtain" medical services, the government
maintained, the MCP "merely regulates how individuals finance and pay
for that active participation-requiring that they do so through
insurance, rather than through attempted self-insurance with the backstop of shifting costs to others."' 99 The Chief Justice and joint dissenters
met this argument not by reasoning from the text of the Commerce
Clause or the principle of federalism, but rather with the language of
liberty and compulsion. The MCP improperly "compels individuals to
become active in commerce," 200 the Chief Justice objected. By acting
directly on "individuals not engaged in commerce," the mandate thus
exceeded the scope of congressional authority established in Wickard,
"'perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority
over intrastate activity . . ..

"'201

Roscoe Filburn was, at the very least,

engaged in the activity of growing wheat, even if not for market. The
joint dissenters similarly charged that Congress had "impressed into
service third parties" 202 unconnected with the market for health care
services; and that in "forc[ing] these individuals to purchase insurance"
it had "command[ed] even those furthest removed from an interstate
market to participate in the market ....

198. Brief for United States, supra note 11, at 50.
199. Id. The minimum coverage provision thus regulated not "inactivity," but rather the
"manner" in which individuals who were already or soon would be active in the market for health care
"finance and pay for [those] services . . . ." Id. at 25.
200. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2587 (majority opinion). See also id at 2586.
201. Id. at 2586 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995)).
202. Id. at 2646 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
203. Id. The state and private plaintiffs similarly described the MCP in terms of liberty and
compulsion. To recognize a "power to force individuals to engage in commercial transactions against
their will" in order to "compel commerce the better to regulate it," argued the state plaintiffs, would
enable Congress "to withhold from individuals the very liberty that the Constitution was designed to
protect." Brief for State Respondents, supra note 65, at 17-18. The private plaintiffs, in particular,
repeatedly characterized the MCP's alleged abridgement of individual contractual liberty as a
transgression of the structural limits of federal power. "The mandate imposes an extraordinary and
unprecedented duty on Americans to enter costly private contracts," they wrote. Brief for Private
Respondents on the Individual Mandate at 7, Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566
(2012) (Nos. 11-393, 11-398, 11-400), 2012 WL 379586, at *7 [hereinafter Brief for Private
Respondents]. "By commanding citizens to subsidize voluntary participants in the insurance industry
through disadvantageous contracts," they continued, the MCP "exemplifies the threat to individual
liberty that occurs when Congress exceeds its limited and enumerated powers." Id Especially
remarkable was their reliance on the 1819 case Dartmouth College v. Woodard to support the
proposition that "Congress should not be presumed to have the power to force 'a new contract' on a
party 'without [his] assent,' for 'the assent of all the parties to be bound by a contract be of its essence."'
Id. at 61 (quoting Trs. of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 662-63 (1819)). In
Dartmouth College, the Court famously held that the trustees of Dartmouth College held a vested
contractual right in their corporate charter, which the state of New Hampshire was prohibited from
revoking by the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution. That the plaintiffs relied on a case striking
down a state law in defense of a vested contractual right, in support of a proposed limitation on the
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Just as the Lochner-era Court had defended the integrity of "private
bargaining"204 against the "compulsory extraction" of "arbitrary
payment[s]," 20 5 the Chief Justice and joint dissenters objected to the
MCP's interference with private economic decision-making in order to
benefit one class (people otherwise unable to afford health insurance) at
the expense of another (the voluntarily uninsured). Indeed, they cited
the potential financial disadvantageousness of the compelled transaction
for some of the uninsured as evidence that the uninsured were not, as the
government maintained, already active in the market for health care
services. "Congress has impressed into service third parties" 206 in order
offset the additional cost to insurers of the guaranteed-issue and
community rating provisions, argued the joint dissenters. The decision
to force into commerce these disproportionately "young and healthy
individuals," many of whom had rationally concluded that purchasing
health insurance was not an "economically sound decision,"2 7was thus
"motivated by the fact that they are further removed from the market
than unhealthy individuals with pre-existing conditions ... . 2 8The
regulation of the uninsured "as a class" was therefore "particularly
divorced from any link to existing commercial activity." 2 09
The Chief Justice similarly characterized the mandate as a
compulsory subsidy, extracted from the voluntarily uninsured for the
benefit of others. "It is precisely because [the uninsured], as an actuarial
class, incur relatively low health care costs," he explained, "that the
mandate helps counter the effect of forcing insurance companies to
cover others who impose greater costs than their premiums are allowed
to reflect." 2 10 The MCP's financial unfairness to the uninsuredparticularly the fact that the mandate could compel economically
irrational purchases-thus bolstered the conclusion that they constituted
an "actuarial class" whose "commercial inactivity rather than activity is
its defining feature." 2 1 1 The Justices' repeated references to "subsidies"
federal commerce power underscores the doctrinal disconnect between their core objection to the MCP
and the constitutional basis of their legal challenge.
204. Adkins v. Children's Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525, 545 (1923).
205. Id at 558.
206. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2646.
207. Id. at 2645.
208. Id. at 2646.
209. Id. at 2590.
210. Id.
211. Id. Recall the discussion in Part III of the Adkins case. See supra notes 151-159 and
accompanying text. According to the Adkins Court, the Washington D.C. minimum wage law deprived
employers and employees of the economic liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment because it fixed the minimum wage according to the minimum needs of the employee
rather than the value of the services provided, as determined by "private bargaining." Adkins v.
Children's Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525, 545 (1923). Because the statutory wage was thus a "payment
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and "actuarial risk" are redolent of Justice Peckham's objection in
Lochner to what he viewed as legislative favoritism. Just as the
Lochner-era Court concluded that maximum hours and minimum wage
laws afforded special privileges to workers by intervening on their
behalf in the process of private bargaining, the Chief Justice and the
joint dissenters objected that the MCP improperly benefited one class at
the expense of another by preventing the uninsured from acting
voluntarily in the health care market.
The parallels with the Lochner-era "liberty of contract" cases are
more than rhetorical. The Justices' defense of economic liberty operates
within the broader logic of their opinions remarkably like the
substantive due process right to economic liberty did a century ago-as
a trigger for heightened means/ends scrutiny. The government's
contention that the MCP regulated "activity" was premised on the close
logical and practical connection between the inevitable consumption of
health care by the uninsured, and health insurance-the interstate
commercial market that, all acknowledged, was a legitimate end of
congressional regulation. The case record included considerable
evidence that the uninsured are significant and predictable consumers of
health care; that a substantial portion of the more than $100 billion in
health care they consume annually goes uncompensated; and that the
cost of that uncompensated care is shifted to the other payers in the
health care system-the government, private insurance companies, and,
ultimately, those who do carry health insurance.2 12 Under the prevailing
post-New Deal judicial approach to federal commercial regulation, such
evidence should have furnished an amble legislative basis for the MCP.
As the Court has often affirmed, a reviewing court "may invalidate
legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause only if it is clear that
there is no rational basis for a congressional finding that the regulated
activity affects interstate commerce, or that there is no reasonable
connection between the regulatory means selected and the asserted
ends."213
for a purpose and upon a basis having no causal connection with his business, or the contract or the
work the employee engages to do"-that is, because the minimum wage defied the logic of the private
marketplace-it amounted to "a naked, arbitrary exercise of power that... cannot be allowed to stand
under the Constitution of the United States." Id, at 558-59.
Perhaps seeking to appeal to a similar judicial instinct against special legislative privileges,
the state plaintiffs repeatedly referred to the MCP as a "subsidy." Brief for State Respondents, supra
note 65, at 46. The private plaintiffs complained that the MCP "compels insurers to .. . ignore actuarial
risk," Brief for Private Respondents, supra note 203, at 2, and then, by forcing the young and healthy
uninsured to "enter into disadvantageous contractual associations with wealthier businesses," id. at 62,
under which they are obliged to pay "inflated premiums that exceed their actuarial risk," id at 38,
furnishing "insurers and their voluntary customers with a $28-39 billion annual subsidy. . . ." Id
212. Brief for United States, supra note 11, at 7-8.
213. Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1981). See also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22
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Instead of deferring to the judgment of Congress, however, Chief
Justice Roberts demanded an extraordinary degree of congruence
between the MCP and a regulable commercial activity-here, the
consumption of health care by the uninsured. Even as he accepted the
government's evidence that "almost all those who are uninsured
will ... engage in a health care transaction," the Chief Justice concluded
that uncertainty surrounding the precise timing of such future
consumption was fatal to the government's theory. "The proposition
that Congress may dictate the conduct of an individual today because of
a prophesied future activity finds no support in our precedent," 214 he
declared. In fact, as Justice Ginsberg noted in dissent, more than 60% of
the uninsured obtain medical care in a given year, and nearly 90% do so
within five years. "An uninsured's consumption of health care is thus
quite proximate," 215 she observed. Under the Chief Justice's exacting
scrutiny, however, the well-documented legislative premise that most of
the uninsured will inevitably consume health care, and that a substantial
portion of those will not pay for it, becomes mere prophesy. 216
Underscoring the alleged discrepancy between legislative means and
ends, the Chief Justice likewise took issue with the government's
seemingly uncontroversial observation that "health care and health care
financing are inherently integrated." "No matter how 'inherently
integrated' health insurance and health care consumption may be," he
insisted, "they are not the same thing: They involve different
transactions, entered into at different times, with different providers." 217
On its face, this statement, which appears to require virtual identity
between legislative ends and means, borders on incoherence. After all,
(2005) (A reviewing court need not determine that the regulated activities, "taken in the aggregate,
substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a 'rational basis' exists for so
concluding."). On rational basis review in the post-Lopez era, see supranote 63 and accompanying text.
214. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2590. The joint dissenters similarly insisted that the uninsured cannot be
made participants in the health care market "by the simple device of defining participants to include all
those who will, later in their lifetime, probably purchase the goods and services covered by the
mandated insurance." Id. at 2648 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
215. Id. at 2618 (Ginsberg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment, and dissenting in
part).
216. The State Respondents likewise objected to the alleged mismatch between legislative means
and ends, and urged exacting scrutiny. In response to the government's claim that the MCP regulates
how "individuals finance their participation in the health care market," Brief for United States, supra
note 11, at 33, the State Respondents observed that the ACA did not "require individuals to actually pay
for health care services with the insurance that the mandate requires them to obtain." Brief for State
Respondents, supra note 65, at 25. Rather, the mandate merely "force[d] individuals to purchase
insurance,which they are free to use or not use in the event that they actually need health care services."
Id. Whereas "a mandate that individuals who obtain health care services use insurance when they do
so . . . would regulate actual participationin the market for health care services," a simple insurance
mandate does not. Id. Under this reasoning, Congress was not entitled to presume that people would
actually use the insurance that the MCP had compelled them to purchase.
217. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2591 (majority opinion).
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the post-New Deal Court had often upheld legislation premised on a far
more attenuated connection between the specific object of the
challenged regulation and the relevant interstate commercial market. 218
Indeed, Congress' factual basis for the MCP surely rests on no more a
"prophesied future" than the prospect that the marijuana gown by Angel
Raich and others for their own medical use would somehow, at some
time in the future, through means not evident in the case record, find its
way into the interstate drug market. 2 19 Moreover, by subdividing an
individual's engagement with the health care system into distinct
"transactions," and thus cabining health care "consumption" and
"financing" from "insurance," Chief Justice Roberts recalls the
"artificial" distinctions between manufacturing and commerce, or direct
and indirect effects on interstate commerce, deployed by the Court to
limit Congress' commerce authority before 1937.220
The apparent incoherence dissolves, however, once we understand
that Congress' unwarranted interference with individual economic
liberty has triggered a shift from a posture of judicial deference to one of
heightened, even unforgiving, judicial scrutiny. How else to make sense
of the Chief Justice's conclusion that "[t]he proximity and degree of
connection between the mandate and the subsequent commercial activity
is too lacking to justify an exception" to the principle that Congress
cannot "force[] individuals into commerce precisely because they
elected to refrain from commercial activity"? 221 Once the Justices
concluded that the MCP abridged individual liberty by forcing the
uninsured to participate in unwanted commerce, they jettisoned the
presumption of constitutionality that normally accompanies federal
commercial legislation. The effect is to shift the burden to the
government to justify the MCP as an "exception" to the principle that
Congress cannot regulate "inactivity."
218. This is perhaps especially true of the so-called "aggregation" theory. See, e.g., Wickard v.
Fillburn, 317 U.S. 111, 133 (1942) (upholding congressional regulation of wheat grown for home
consumption); Raich, 545 U.S. at 32-33 (upholding congressional regulation of marijuana grown for
personal use).
219. As Justice Scalia explained in Raich, Congress' authority to prohibit a host of drug-related
conduct, including the mere possession of marijuana intrastate, "depends only upon whether they are
appropriate means of achieving the legitimate end of eradicating (such] substances from interstate
commerce.... [M]arijuana that is grown at home and possessed for personal use is never more than an
instant from the interstate market. . . ." Raich, 545 U.S. at 40 (Scalia, J., concurring).
220. Roberts' assertion that, because health insurance and health care consumption are "not the
same thing" and "involve different transactions," the insurance mandate bore an insufficiently proximate
connection to the interstate commercial market in health care financing strikes one as a similarly
cramped and almost willfully unreal reading of "interstate commerce." NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2591. The
Court explicitly rejected this kind of transaction-specific analysis in Jones & Laughlin Steel, in 1937, in
favor of a more functional, "practical conception" of interstate commerce. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41-42 (1937).
221. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2591.
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Indeed, the Chief Justice's demand for virtual congruence between
the MCP and the consumption and financing of health care recalls
Justice Peckham's pronouncement in Lochner that legislation that
impairs individual economic freedom "must have a more direct relation,
as a means to an end" than it would otherwise.22 2 The Adair Court's
threshold conclusion that the challenged federal labor regulation invaded
the plaintiff's substantive due process right to economic liberty similarly
triggered heightened scrutiny of the "legal or logical connection"
between "bettering the conditions and conserving the interests
of... wage-earners" 223 and the regulation of interstate commerce. 224 i
NFIB v. Sebelius, the Justices' conclusion that the MCP denied the
uninsured liberty to remain outside of the regulated commercial market
triggered a similarly exacting scrutiny of congressional means and ends.
In concluding that the "proximity and degree of connection between the
mandate and the subsequent commercial activity" were insufficient to
qualify the MCP as a regulation of commerce, 225 the Chief Justice was,
like the Adair Court, remapping the intrinsic limits on congressional
authority in the service of individual liberty.
C. FederalismWithout States
Having concluded that the individual mandate did not qualify as a
regulation of commerce, Chief Justice Roberts turned to the
government's attempt to circumvent the "inactivity" problem by
channeling Congress' commerce authority through the Necessary and
Proper Clause. Recall from Part II that even in the post-Lopez era, the
Necessary and Proper Clause authorized Congress to "regulate purely
intrastate activity that is not itself 'commercial,' . . . if it concludes that

failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation of
the [relevant] interstate market . . . 226 The government accordingly
argued that the MCP was "necessary to make effective the Act's core
reforms of the insurance market, i.e., the guaranteed-issue and
community-rating provisions." 227 And in fact, all of the Justices
222. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905).
223. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 178 (1908).
224. See supranotes 137-150 and accompanying text.
225. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2591.
226. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 18 (2005). See supranote 62 and accompanying text. "The
regulation of an intrastate activity may be essential to a comprehensive regulation of interstate
commerce even though the intrastate activity does not itself 'substantially affect' interstate commerce."
Id. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring).
227. Brief for United States, supra note 11, at 24. Under the government's theory, the Chief
Justice explained, "it is not necessary to consider the effect that an individual's inactivity may have on
interstate commerce; it is enough that Congress regulate commercial activity in a way that requires
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appeared to accept that the guaranteed issue and community-rating
provisions would be ineffectual so long as those currently uninsured
remained outside of the insurance risk pool.
Chief Justice Roberts and the joint dissenters nevertheless concluded
that "the individual mandate cannot be sustained under the Necessary
and Proper Clause as an essential component of the insurance
reforms."22 8 Although the Court had "been very deferential to
Congress's determination that a regulation is 'necessary,"' often
upholding legislative means that are merely "'convenient, or useful' or
'conducive' to the regulation of interstate commerce, the Chief Justice
explained, the Necessary and Proper Clause had never been read to
authorize "laws that undermine the structure of the government
established by the Constitution." 22 9 The MCP may well be "necessary"
to the operation of the ACA, he declared, but as a '"usurpation",230 of
"'state sovereignty,"' 23 1 it was not a "proper" means of executing an
enumerated power. Under this novel reading, the Necessary and Proper
Clause thus acts as a structural constraint on the scope of congressional
authority.
Notwithstanding (or perhaps because of) its novelty, however, the
Justices in the Commerce Clause majority couched the MCP's alleged
impropriety in a staple tenet of the New Federalism-the notion that
federalism "'secures to citizens the liberties that derive from a diffusion
of sovereign power."' 232 The Framers lodged the police power in "50
different States rather than one national sovereignty," the Chief Justice
explained, in order to ensure that "the facets of governing that touch on
citizens' daily lives are normally administered by smaller governments
closer to the governed," which are "more accountable than a distant
federal bureaucracy." 233 "'By denying any one government complete
jurisdiction over the concerns of public life,"' he continued, federalism
234
thus "'protects the liberty of the individual from arbitrary power."'
The joint dissenters likewise emphasized the essential connection
between the Constitution's "structural protections-notably, the
regulation of inactivity to be effective." NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2591.
228. Id at 2592.
229. Id (quoting United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010)).
230. Id. (quoting Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 924 (1997)).
231. Id (quoting Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1967 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)).
232. Id at 2578 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992)). For a helpful
overview of the "values of federalism," including the protection of individual liberty, see Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Values ofFederalism,47 FLA. L. REv. 499, 525-30 (1995); Barry Friedman, Valuing
Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REv. 317, 402-04 (1997).
233. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2578 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 109 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
234. Id. (quoting Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011)).
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restraints imposed by federalism and the separation of powers-[and
the] personal freedom" of the governed. "The fragmentation of power
produced by the structure of our Government is central to liberty," they
warned, "and when we destroy it, we place liberty at peril."23 5
As a matter of constitutional discourse, such claims are relatively
uncontroversial.23 6 The notion that federalism serves to protect liberty
enjoys a distinguished heritage stretching back to the founding era; 237 in
recent decades, moreover, the federalism/liberty nexus has been a
prominent feature of the Court's New Federalism. 238 Critically,
however, even as various Justices have celebrated the protection of
individual liberty as a particularly salutary consequence of the
Constitution's diffusion of governmental authority, the essential object
of the Court's federalism jurisprudence has remained the preservation of
state sovereignty. To the extent that enforcing federalist limits on
congressional authority served to enhance liberty, it did so incidentally,
235. Id. at 2677 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). Perhaps aware that their
proffered limiting principle fit awkwardly at best into existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the
Act's challengers strained mightily to repackage their argument in the language of federalism. One
notable result is the unsupportable claim that, in adopting the ACA, Congress had treaded into a "sector
traditionally left to the States." Brief for State Respondents, supra note 65, at 38. "Since its earliest
days," they reasoned, "the Court has recognized that 'health laws of every description' are among 'that
immense mass of legislation ... which can be most advantageously exercised by the States themselves."
Id. at 37 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824)). There was therefore "no
question that the individual mandate usurps the States' police power to protect the health and liberty of
their residents." Id. at 38. This argument cynically conflates the meaning of "health" in traditional state
police power rubric with the modem health care system, in which the federal government has long acted
as both the single largest payer and a pervasive regulator.
236. See infra note 238. Whether they are also empirically valid is, of course, a separate question.
See, e.g., EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL

ENTERPRISE: A HISTORICAL INQUIRY 165 (2007) (describing the "dubious and unproven" relationship
between federalism and liberty).
237. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 225 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin F. Wright ed.
1996) ("It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system, that the State governments will,
in all possible contingencies, afford complete security against invasions of the public liberty by the
national authority."); THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 357 (James Madison) ("In the compound republic of
America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and
then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double
security arises to the rights of the people.").
238. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 459 (1991) ("In the tension between federal and
state power lies the promise of liberty."); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (The balance of power between the federal government and the states "plays too vital a
role in securing freedom for us to admit inability to intervene when one or the other level of
Government has tipped the scales too far."); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 (1997) ("Just as
the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent
the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States
and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front."); United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 655 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("No one denies the importance of the
Constitution's federalist principles. Its state/federal division of authority protects liberty-both by
restricting the burdens that government can impose from a distance and by facilitating citizen
participation in government that is close to home.").
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as an indirect result of protecting states against federal encroachment.
By reading the term "proper" as a federalist constraint on Congress'
authority to enact the MCP, however, the Chief Justice and joint
dissenters confound this traditional formulation. The basic difficulty
lies in the fact that the MCP acts directly on individuals, and does not
meaningfully implicate the sovereignty of the states. Indeed, in both
New York and Printz-the cases from which the Chief Justice draws in
laying out the individual liberty rationale for federalism-the federal
statute at issue exceeded Congress' authority because it acted on the
states as states, by "commandeering" state officials or legislative
processes in the implementation of a federal regulatory scheme. By
forbidding such federal commandeering, and thus preserving an
inviolable bastion of state sovereignty, the New York and Printz
majorities had maintained, the Constitution also protected individual
liberty. 239 At the same time, however, those cases affirmed Congress'
broad authority to regulate individuals directly.240
Chief Justice Roberts inverts the logic of the federalism-liberty
theorem described in the anti-commandeering cases. Immediately after
announcing that the term "proper" in the Necessary and Proper Clause
prohibited usurpations of state sovereignty, he proceeded to describe the
impropriety of the MCP not as a violation of state prerogatives, but
rather in terms of unchecked congressional authority to compel
By "vest[ing] Congress with the
individuals into commerce.
extraordinary ability to create the necessary predicate to the exercise of
an enumerated power," he declared, the MCP would empower Congress
to "reach beyond the natural limit of its authority and draw within its
regulatory scope those who otherwise would be outside of it." 24 1
In fact, the conventional markers of state sovereignty-the
prerogatives of state officials; the integrity of state legislative processes;
the essentially "local" nature of the regulated conduct; the natural
domain of state regulatory competence-are not implicated by the MCP,
and do not enter into the Chief Justice's ostensibly "federalist" account
of the MCP's impropriety. The improper "expansion of federal

239. "The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States or
state governments as abstract political entities, or even for the benefit of the public officials governing
the States," the New York majority explained. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992).
"To the contrary, the Constitution divides authority between federal and state governments for the
protection of individuals." Id.
240. As Justice Scalia wrote for the Printz majority, "the Framers rejected the concept of a central
government that would act upon and through the States, and instead designed a system in which the
State and Federal Governments would exercise concurrent authority over the people-who were. . . 'the
only proper objects of the government."' Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919-20 (1997) (quoting
THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 109 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
241. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2592 (majority opinion).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

57

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 1

744

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 82

authority" centers, in Chief Justice Roberts' analysis, not on any
usurpation of state sovereignty, but rather on the threatened usurpation
of individual sovereignty. Whereas New York and Printz preserve state
sovereignty in order to, among other things, protect individual liberty,
the Chief Justice concludes that, because the MCP improperly interferes
with individual liberty, it necessarily "undermines the [federalist]
structure of government established by the Constitution." 242 This is, for
all intents and purposes, federalism without states.
V. CONCLUSION

This Article reads Chief Justice Roberts and the joint dissenters'
Commerce Clause analyses in NFIB v. Sebelius through this historical
lens of the Supreme Court's Lochner-era substantive due process
jurisprudence. As Part III argued, those cases illustrate how constraints
on legislative authority that are rooted in "fundamental" economic rights
and constraints on legislative authority that are rooted in federalism and
the constitutional enumeration of powers necessarily operate in dynamic
relationship to one another; and, further, that the Lochner-era Court
adapted the scope of both state and federal legislative authority in order
to vindicate the value of economic liberty.
Understanding that rights-based constraints on legislative authority,
on the one hand, and textual and structural constraints, on the other, are
in fact mutually constitutive provides an important alternative analytical
framework to the structure/rights dichotomy advanced by the Chief
Justice and joint dissenters. That framework better equips us to
recognize that the value of individual economic liberty infuses the
reasoning of NFIB's Commerce Clause majority. Even in the absence
of a formal constitutional economic "right" to serve as a doctrinal
vehicle, the Justices' defense of economic liberty operates much as the
substantive due process right to "liberty of contract" did during the
Lochner era-as a trigger for heightened scrutiny of legislative means
and ends, through which they reinterpreted the constitutive terms of the
commerce power and thereby narrowed its intrinsic scope.
This is problematic for two reasons. First, heightened scrutiny is
normally reserved for rights that are "fundamental" (as well as suspect
242. Id. Professors Rosen and Schmidt reach a similar conclusion, identifying "a new theory of
federalism" at work in the Chief Justice's opinion, "in which liberty has been transformed from a
consequent benefit of state sovereignty to an independent value of federalism itself." Rosen & Schmidt,
supra note 16, at 124. By embedding "a liberty value into the Commerce Clause and Necessary and
Proper Clause analyses themselves," id. at 125, they argue, this novel "Liberty-Centered Federalism"
"allowed the Court to acknowledge that the critics of the ACA were raising a legitimate concern with
regard to the mandate's impact on the freedoms of the American people, but to do so without
resurrecting substantive due process and Lochner." Id. at 127.
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classifications), and the Supreme Court has disavowed the
fundamentality of constitutional economic rights since 1937.243 The
activity/inactivity distinction circumvents this obstacle by embedding an
individual liberty interest directly in the Court's enumerated powers
jurisprudence. Because the Court upheld the MCP under the General
Welfare Clause, however, it is tempting to conclude that,
notwithstanding its novelty, the limiting principle endorsed by a
majority of the Court is unlikely to be of much consequence. After all,
Congress had never adopted a purchase mandate before, and there is no
reason to expect it to do so in the future.
This brings us to the second difficulty. When we read the
activity/inactivity distinction not only as a discrete limitation on the
scope of the commerce power, but also a nearly successful effort to
embed a Lochner-style constitutional liberty interest in the structural
constitution, the principle threatens to upend the traditional relationship
between individual liberty and federalism. The Lochner-era substantive
due process right to economic liberty evolved from a trigger for
heightened (though by no means fatal 2 44) scrutiny into something
approaching a constitutional presumption against legislative interference
in the private labor market. s One might reasonably worry that the
economic liberty interest endorsed by the Chief Justice and joint
dissenters could similarly ripen from a narrow prohibition on federal
purchase mandates into a broader injunction against congressional
interference with individual liberty, in which individual sovereignty
takes its place alongside state sovereignty in the structural constitution.

243. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
244. See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) (upholding a Utah law limiting the hours of labor
for miners and smelters as a valid exercise of the police power); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908)
(upholding an Oregon law limiting the hours of labor for women as a valid exercise of the police
power); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
245. See Adkins v. Children's Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (striking down federal law
providing for a minimum wage for women in Washington D.C.); Morehead v. New York, 298 U.S. 587
(1936) (striking down a New York law prohibiting the payment of "oppressive and unreasonable"
wages).
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